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I. INTRODUCTION
State courts are not doing what they are supposed to do-at least when it
comes to state constitutions. Beginning with Justice Brennan's famous
article in 1977,1 academic commentary on "New Judicial Federalism" has
debated whether and how state high courts should interpret their state
constitutions in relation to the Federal Constitution. The vast majority of
commentators have argued for a robust state constitutionalism, urging state
courts to imbue state constitutions with meaning independent of the federal
document, even where the text is similar or identical. The most prominent
rationale offered by these scholars, and one frequently developed in those
state court decisions that do interpret their constitutions, is what James
Gardner has labeled "Romantic Subnationalism. ''2 Loosely, this argument
supposes that state constitutions are the repositories of the fundamental
values of the state's citizens, and assigns an innate "character" to a state
Volk that finds expression in its unique charter.3 Critics of this brand of
state constitutionalism, most notably Professor Gardner himself, have
attacked the pro-state constitutionalism arguments as disconnected from the
actual relationship between state polities and their constitutions.4
Meanwhile, in stark contrast to the academic majority's view that state
constitutions deserve vigorous and autonomous construction, the state courts
have exasperated partisans on both sides of the debate by undertaking this
project only inconsistently, if not downright erratically. 5  By examining
decisions from a sample of four states closely aligned with the state
1. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REV. 489, 489 (1977) (arguing that state courts should respond to the U.S. Supreme
Court's retreat from Warren Court era civil liberties protections by giving state constitutions
independent meaning to protect rights above the sinking federal floor).
2. JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF
FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 20-21 (2005).
3. Id. at 53-55, 58, 65; see also Jim Rossi, The Puzzle of State Constitutions, 54 BUFF. L. REV.
211, 218 (2006) (book review).
4. GARDNER, supra note 2, at 56, 66-68.
5. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV.
271, 271 (1998) (describing state constitutional theory as a failure that has not been accepted by the
courts); James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761,
779 (1992) (cataloging the failure of seven states to give consistently independent meaning to their
state constitutions); Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84
VA. L. REV. 389, 390-91 (1998) (acknowledging that despite scholarly attention to state
constitutions, state courts have been largely content to follow the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Federal Constitution); Ellen A. Peters, State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law
Tradition, 84 MICH. L. REV. 583, 591-92 (1986) (reviewing DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985)) (describing the author's view, as a state
supreme court chief justice, of state constitutional theory as "eclectic" and favoring the application
of varying theories depending on the case); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State
Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1172 (1985)
(describing one state as following, "at least sometimes," a method of state constitutionalism wherein
the court turns to its state constitution only to fill in gaps in federal law).
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constitutionalism movement, I show how inconsistent state courts still are in
interpreting their constitutions.6 That this inconsistency persists more than
ten years after Professor Gardner first demonstrated state courts' lack of
enthusiasm for sustained state constitutionalism poses a serious challenge to
this purportedly halcyon era of new judicial federalism.7 I break new ground
not because I prove an inconsistency between state practice and academic
theory (although my work in that respect updates and confirms the previous
evidence), but because I offer a unique new explanation for why this
divergence is neither avoidable nor undesirable.8
Scholars have devoted little attention to explaining the gap between the
seemingly logical and persuasive arguments for robust state
constitutionalism in the law reviews and the actual spotty performance of
state constitutionalism in the courts.9  To the limited extent that
commentators have sought to cover the distance between "ought" and "is"
(rather than debate whether state courts should give their constitutions
independent meaning at all), the attempts have ranged from a description of
state courts as simply incompetent, to a portrayal of state constitutions as too
picayune and political to carry the weight of independent analysis.1 0 Some
commentators have blamed advocates for not briefing state constitutional
arguments" or even law schools for not training lawyers to be attuned to
6. See infra notes 188-291 and accompanying text.
7. See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 779 (cataloging the failure of seven states to give consistently
independent meaning to their state constitutions); Lawrence Friedman & Charles H. Baron, Baker v.
State and the Promise of the New Judicial Federalism, 43 B.C. L. REv. 125, 126-27 (2001) (pointing
out that many states proudly assert their power to give state constitutions independent meaning, but
then frequently rely exclusively on federal analysis in deciding actual cases); John W. Shaw,
Comment, Principled Interpretations of State Constitutional Law-Why Don't the 'Primacy' States
Practice What They Preach?, 54 U. PITT. L. REv. 1019 passim (1993) (reviewing empirically the
disparity between state courts' assertions of autonomous state constitutionalism and their differing
actual practice); Michael Esler, State Supreme Court Commitment to State Law, 78 JUDICATURE 25,
25 (1994) (showing empirically that even states with leading decisions supportive of autonomous
state constitutionalism still fail to employ independent analysis in most cases).
8. See infra Parts IV, V, VI.
9. Of course, legal theorists generally are open to attack for failing to describe real-world
practice sufficiently. See Stephen D. Smith, Believing Like a Lawyer, 40 B.C. L. REv. 1041, 1044
(1999) (describing a gap between jurisprudence and positive legal doctrine, despite legal theorists'
"ostentatious" devotion to closing the gap).
10. See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, State Constitutionalism and the Problems of Fairness, 30 VAL. U. L.
REv. 459, 470-71 (1996) (describing state constitutions as closer to politics than law and more
representative of "entrenched interests" than "a consensus on values" because they are "rife with
protection for particular interest groups").
11. See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, Introduction: The Third State of the New Judicial Federalism,
59 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 211, 220 (2003) ("Despite the development of the New Judicial
Federalism nearly two generations ago, lawyers still fail to properly argue the state constitutional
grounds where available.").
state constitutionalism.12 Some have even argued that state constitutionalism
simply has not been around long enough to engage the courts.
13
To develop my arguments, in Part II of this Article I look more closely
at scholars' arguments in favor of a more consistent and vigorous state
constitutionalism, followed by a discussion of some of the leading critiques
of those theories. 14  Part III will examine the state constitutionalism as
actually practiced in state courts, reviewing decisions from Oregon,
Washington, New Jersey, and New Hampshire, all states that have adopted
independent interpretations of their constitutions but not consistently. 5 Part
IV will seek to reconcile theory and practice by describing how state
constitutionalism works to establish state-based communities, giving special
attention to the culture-making role of lawyers in that process.
6
Specifically, Part IV will emphasize different ways in which framing a
political controversy as a state constitutional controversy is the main method
for creating a state community, not the particular value or result favored by
the state high court.' 7 In this sense, the medium is the message. Part V of
this Article will explain why performing state constitutionalism only
intermittently, even when faced with issues resolvable under state
constitutions, is a sufficient approach to state constitutions to develop a
sense of belonging in a state community. 8  Because Americans owe
allegiance to a variety of overlapping communities, including the Nation,
courts and the communities they address will naturally view some public
disputes as aspects of a state identity and other disputes as better resolved at
different levels of government, or even extra-legally. In Part VI, I argue that
the construction of state communities through intermittent state
constitutionalism advances laudable goals by strengthening our values of
participatory democracy, freedom, and pluralism. 19
In this Article, I examine the conventional reasons why state courts
persist in refusing to apply state constitutions as regularly as outside
observers would like, and add two more reasons that theorists have not yet
fully developed.2 ° The first of these, the "liberal ratchet, ' 2' has been often
12. See, e.g., Friedman & Baron, supra note 7, at 156-57.
13. Abrahamson, supra note 5, at 1163 (arguing that lawyers were treating state constitutional
arguments cavalierly, in part because the issue was too new). But see Ronald K.L. Collins,
Forward: The Once "New Judicial Federalism" & Its Critics, 64 WASH. L. REv. 5, 5 (1989)
(pointing out, in 1989, that the state constitutionalism debate had been ongoing for over a decade,
too long still to be called "new") (citation omitted).
14. See infra notes 59-187 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 188-291 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 292-351 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 292-351 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 352-71 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 372-86 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 111-63 and accompanying text.
21. This is the idea that state constitutionalism tends to yield more "liberal" results than adhering
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noted." The theory has typically been given little weight, however, possibly
because it suggests that judicial decision-making is ends-oriented and
ideologically driven." Another reason for state court reluctance to follow
academic urging on state constitutionalism is, arguably, a nationalist view of
law, analogous to "American Exceptionalism" in the transnational context,
24
that crowds out competing visions of the proper sources of judicial decision-
making. State courts sometimes seem wary of relying on any legal authority
that might implicitly or explicitly undermine the judges' view that American
law, i.e. national law, is the best and most legitimate legal regime possible.25
Consistent state constitutionalism has this effect.
After offering potential reasons for why state courts act irregularly in
this field, I argue that the gap between the scholars and the judges is not due
to judicial ignorance or willfulness, but actually is socially useful.26
Intermittent, rather than routine, reliance on state constitutions helps foster a
sense of communal identity centered on the state. My argument here
acknowledges that state constitutions do not reflect the fundamental essence
of some mystical state culture, but nevertheless asserts that state
constitutions can be (and are) used to encourage a unique state legal culture
and a corresponding sense of belonging in the state's citizens.27 Drawing on
insights from scholars of law and culture as well as state constitutionalism, I
discuss the role of law in re-creating, as well as reflecting, the culture from
which it arises.2 8
Intermittent state constitutionalism plays an important part in building a
feeling of state community merely by casting controversial questions as
to the Federal Constitution. See Peter Linzer, Why Bother with State Bills of Rights?, 68 TEX. L.
REV. 1573, 1576-79 (1990) (acknowledging, but denying the force of, the argument that state
constitutionalism will tend to protect liberal ideological goals more than conservative goals).
22. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet-Justice Brennan and the Theory of State
Constitutional Law, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429, 433 (1988) (noting that it is "virtually
guarantee[d] that state court activism will have an overwhelmingly liberal effect" because states are
bound to protect individual rights at least as much as the Federal Constitution does).
23. See generally Linzer, supra note 21, at 1576-79 (noting state court decisions in which both
conservative and liberal ends were reached as a result of political ideologies).
24. "American Exceptionalism" in this Article means the tendency to view America and its
government as the pinnacle of global progress and as therefore not bound by the ordinary laws and
conventions applicable to other jurisdictions.
25. See, e.g., Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 27 (Tex. 1992) (Hecht, J., concurring)
(refusing to follow majority's state constitutional interpretation and adopting instead "American"
law as determined by the Federal Supreme Court interpreting the Federal Constitution); McGrath v.
Toys "R" Us, Inc., 821 N.E.2d 519, 521-22 (N.Y. 2004) (noting special state commitment to civil
rights protection, but adopting federal standards and following federal precedents).
26. See infra notes 292-95 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 323-51 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 301-07 and accompanying text.
resolvable under the state's particular fundamental law. The debate about
meaning becomes, itself, a facet of identity for those engaged in it. Locating
any particular debate within a state framework represents an assertion by the
state court that states are the appropriate community for carrying out that
discourse, regardless of which end result one prefers. The language, cultural
cues, and legal texts of the state become the raw materials of a real
community. In short, the state constitution constitutes the state.
This phenomenon need not be frequent, or even regular, to be effective,
because individual identities will always be multi-faceted. Some part of
each person's identity may attach to a state-wide community, but other
aspects will remain firmly nationalistic. States will probably never be the
primary community or source of identity for most Americans. 9 On the
other hand, states may play some small part, at least once in a while, for
nearly all Americans.30 Intermittent state constitutionalism recognizes and
encourages this polyvalent sense of cultural identity.
3 1
As part of this explanation, I examine the special role of lawyers as
translators of this culture grounded, in part, in state constitutionalism. 32
Conceiving of state constitutionalism as a one-way communication from the
state's people to its high court not only fails to respect the culture-
constituting effect of state constitutionalism, but also fails to understand the
mediating role played by lawyers as translators of popular narratives into
legal language and back again.33 Giving due weight to the role of lawyers in
making and re-making culture is important because lawyers do exhibit the
sort of state-based communal feeling that critics contend is absent from the
average American.34 The common criticism that Americans are too mobile
and too influenced by national cultural forces to feel loyal to a state as a
coherent community falls short when applied to lawyers, a group of culture-
workers that is marked by relatively unusual geographic isolation within
state jurisdictions.
29. See Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Federalism, Lliberty & State Constitutional
Law, 23 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 1457, 1468 (1997).
30. See infra notes 334-48 and accompanying text.
31. See infra note 339 and accompanying text.
32. See infra note 324 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 324 and accompanying text.
34. See infra note 339 and accompanying text.
35. Multijurisdictional practice seems to be growing, and many lawyers represent their clients'
national or even global interests. See Am. Bar Ass'n, Report of the Commission on
Multijurisdictional Practice 10 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/finalmjp_ rpt_
5-17.pdf. Nevertheless, the more typical interaction between a lawyer and client still centers on
small-business contracts, petty crimes, property transactions, and estate planning. Lawsuits filed in
state courts, which are more likely to handle these smaller-scale disputes, vastly outnumbered
federal filings. See Nat'l Ctr. for State Cts., Examining the Work of State Courts, 2002: A National
Perspective from the Court Statistics Project 13 (Brian J. Ostrom et al. eds., 2003), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2002_Files/2002_Overview.pdf (reporting that nearly 93
million cases were begun in state courts in 2001, compared with just over 2 million federal cases). A
[Vol. 34: 41, 2006] Intermittent State Constitutionalism
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
While the argument that intermittent state constitutionalism fosters a
state-based community is primarily descriptive, I further assert that building
such a community is normatively worthwhile.36 The most important reason
for encouraging the development of state communities as one facet of
citizens' identities derives from the basic premise of "Our Federalism":
participatory democracy is enhanced when as much autonomy as possible is
given to the smallest possible community.37 When Americans feel that part
of their loyalty belongs to their state, they experience a sense that important
problems can be debated and resolved at the state level.38 This feeling
encourages political activism at a level of government far easier for the
average person to influence than the federal government in Washington.
When issues labeled "constitutional" are made accessible in this way, the
conventional equation of "constitutional" with "important" means that even
"fundamental" issues are treated as resolvable by the state community.
39
This idea is far from original-rather, it is inherent in the Federal
Constitution as intended by the Framers.
A growing sense of state-based identity also necessarily implies greater
cultural diversity among the states as each state's people diverge somewhat
from their neighbors to construct their own collective identities.40  This
diversity has several beneficial effects. Competition among states permits
people to vote with their feet-a culturally amenable legal regime in one
state will attract citizens from other states with less agreeable communal
conditions.4" Furthermore, cultural diversity centered on state-based
identities fosters a healthy pluralism that strengthens the bonds tying the
national community together. If state-based identities are recognized and
valued as part of the American experience, even though they may be
different from one another, we are more likely to reject the jingoism
associated with American Exceptionalism.42  States, as cultural
communities, can teach us that speaking different legal talk from our
bar association study confirms what common sense suggests: most clients are not General Electric,
and most lawyers don't work for Skadden, Arps. See Am. Bar Ass'n, Lawyer Demographics,
available at http://www.abanet.org/market research/lawyer demographics_2006.pdf (reporting that,
nationwide, 76% of law firms had five or fewer lawyers in 2000).
36. See infra Part VI.
37. See infra Part VI.
38. See infra Part VI.
39. See infra Part VI.
40. See infra Part VI.
41. See infra Part VI.
42. See infra Part VI.
neighbors, or carrying out different public debates, does not impair our
membership in a distinct national community.43
A. Definition of Key Terms
Before proceeding further, I must explain the terms I use. Independent
state constitutional interpretation includes decisions fitting in any of three
analytical categories: "primacy," "dualism," or "interstitialism."A4  In a
decision following the "primacy" approach, a state court will evaluate a
legal claim under its state constitution first, before reaching a federal
question.45 Only if the state constitution does not protect the right will the
court go on to examine whether the Federal Constitution offers greater
protection.46 Under a jurisprudence of "dualism," a court will examine both
the state and Federal Constitutions, regardless of whether one or the other
disposes of the case.47 This practice can result in decisions founded on both
sources of law, leaving the federal reasoning unreviewable by the United
States Supreme Court 48 and the state reasoning mostly immune from change
within the state.49 The "interstitial" approach requires a state court to first
examine the Federal Constitution. 50  If that Constitution (and federal
decisions interpreting it) does not support the claim, the court will examine
the state constitution to determine if it offers any reason to depart from the
presumptively correct federal standard.51 While these approaches each
describe varying levels of state autonomy, for purposes of this Article I treat
each of them as coherent with autonomous state constitutionalism.
In contrast, the much-derided "lockstep" approach is not a true state
constitutional theory at all.52 Under "lockstep" analysis state courts bind the
meaning of state constitutional provisions to their parallel federal
43. See infra Part VI.
44. See generally Jason J. Legg, Comment, The Green Mountain Boys Still Love Their Freedom:
Criminal Jurisprudence of the Vermont Supreme Court, 60 ALB. L. REv. 1799, 1803-05 (1997)
(describing these three theories of state constitutionalism as well as the "lockstep" approach).
45. Id. at 1804.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1803.
48. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (establishing the "clear statement" rule of
the "adequate and independent" doctrine for federal jurisdiction over state court judgments). See
generally Catherine T. Struve, Direct and Collateral Federal Court Review of the Adequacy of State
Procedural Rules, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 244 (2003) (discussing the federal review of judgments
by state courts).
49. Legg, supra note 44, at 1803.
50. Id. at 1804.
51. Id. at 1804-05.
52. See generally G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 182 (1998)
(describing lockstep approach as rendering state constitutions superfluous); Robert F. Williams,
State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case Adoptionism or Prospective
Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1499, 1502-18 (2005) (examining state decisions holding
state constitutional clauses to federal standards).
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counterparts, either case by case or as a broad rule.53 Once a state court
concludes that the claim falls under a section of the state constitution that
has a federal analogue, all further state-law analysis is abandoned and the
court treats the question as one of purely Federal Constitutional law.5 4 In
this Article, I argue that decisions exhibiting lockstep analysis indicate a
refusal to interpret the state constitution and an implicit holding by the state
court that the issue presented should be nationally uniform and ultimately
resolved by the Federal Supreme Court.55
"Intermittent state constitutionalism" rejects the descriptive power of the
three interpretive categories for any level of analysis beyond an individual
case. Instead, the phrase describes a state court that alters its theoretical
approach from case to case--even when the court has explicitly adopted one
theory or another in a so-called "teaching opinion." Intermittent state
constitutionalism reflects variance, within a state, among the three main
interpretive approaches described above, plus occasional decisions following
federal law in lockstep. The later parts of this Article will offer some
explanations for why courts depart from their chosen theories of state
constitutionalism.
In testing whether a state follows intermittent state constitutionalism, I
consider only those decisions where the state high court declared that the
state constitutional issue was raised. Although courts do occasionally
dismiss properly briefed state constitutional claims without addressing them,
either sub silentio or with a catch-all conclusion, for practical reasons those
cases are not included in my study here. Fortunately, courts typically give
explicit recognition of a properly presented state constitutional question in
any case following any of the conventional theories, from primacy to
lockstep, even if the analysis follows federal law. Our inquiry will, so that
the party raising the question knows it has been considered. I do not limit
the inquiry to cases addressing state constitutional clauses with exact textual
parallels in the Federal Constitution because a surprising number of
decisions confronting clauses without any federal parallel still rely on
federal precedents as the basis for decision. 56 Similarly, although the bulk of
the commentary and case law in this field refers to claims of individual
53. Legg, supra note 44, at 1803.
54. Id.
55. See infra notes 384-93 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 152 (Tenn. 1993) (noting
that the "equal protection provisions of the Tennessee Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment
are historically and linguistically distinct" but applying federal precedent and equal protection
jurisprudence anyway).
rights, 57 I consider structural questions decided under the state constitutions
to be part of this project, as well.58
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM'S EVER-OPTIMISTIC ACADEMIC
ADVOCATES (AND THEIR CRITICS)
Although state constitutionalism came before the Federal Constitution in
time, the federal document has utterly overwhelmed those of the states in
mainstream legal discussion. Law schools teach entire courses on
"Constitutional Law" without ever mentioning the fifty constitutions
complementing, and in some cases predating, the one written in
Philadelphia.5 9  Academic commentators blithely discuss constitutional
verities without a passing word for the often different situation in the states.
Justice William Brennan escaped the conventions of this nationalist mindset
in 1977 to provoke modem state constitutionalism, known as New Judicial
Federalism. 60 Justice Brennan's State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights6 1 promoted a great awakening of state constitutionalism as
the antidote to the United States Supreme Court's increasing tendency to
defer to government actors, rather than maintain or expand Warren Court era
57. Many scholars seem to have drawn a sharp distinction between individual rights and
structure-of-government disputes under state constitutions, and subsequently devoted far more
attention to individual rights. See, e.g., JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (4th ed. 2006) (limiting a two-volume
treatise on "state constitutional law" to questions surrounding the litigation of individual-rights
cases); see also Robert F. Williams, A Research Agenda in State Constitutional Law, 66 TEMP. L.
REV. 1145, 1147 (urging a shift from scholarship too focused on rights to one attentive to intrastate
structural issues, like the line-item veto). This rights/structure distinction seems not to reflect the
perspective of the judges, who are confronted with litigants making rights arguments under either
type of dispute. For example, a criminal defendant argues she has a "right" to have the evidence
suppressed, while a governor argues he has a "right" to fire a commissioner; to the judges deciding
the cases, there seems little reason to employ different kinds of legal analysis to the different cases.
The structural disputes can certainly have secondary effects on individual rights (an exhaustion
requirement imposed on challenges to administrative agency action, for example, obviously limits
individuals' freedom to challenge the executive branch), and individual rights disputes can affect
governmental structure (a right to a public education compels the state to establish the bureaucratic
apparatus necessary to provide that benefit). See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 260-65 (describing how
state constitutional structural decisions also affect individual rights and the state's ability to resist
federal authority where appropriate). Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution
Lack Social and Economic Guarantees, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 7 (2005) (explaining that "all
constitutional rights cost money," such that the distinction between positive and negative rights is
not theoretically meaningful); George Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., All Sail and No
Anchor-Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975, 975
(1979) (describing how increased protection of individual rights shifts structural balance of power
away from the legislature toward the state courts).
58. See infra notes 104, 142-45 and accompanying text.
59. See Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions Are Not Common Law: Comments on Gardner's
Failed Discourse, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 927, 933 (1993) (describing basic courses in constitutional law
as so federally focused that they give law students no reason to look for state constitutional issues).
60. See generally Brennan, supra note I.
61. Id.
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human rights protections.62 By arguing that the state courts could, and
should, elevate individual protections above those provided by Supreme
Court interpretations of the Federal Constitution, all without the possibility
of review or reversal in the Supreme Court, Justice Brennan provided
substantial intellectual and political cover to those state court judges who
already felt inclined to avoid the conservative federal holdings.63 Justice
Brennan's article, by itself, was little more than a collection of cases
showing a conservative trend by his colleagues, another collection of cases
showing states providing greater human rights protections than the federal
cases, and an observation of the truism that state courts are legally entitled to
interpret their state constitutions as more protective of liberty than the
Federal Constitution. 64  The real ground-breaking had already been
accomplished seven years earlier, by Hans Linde, then a professor and later
a Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court.65 Nevertheless, Justice Brennan's
insight inspired an army of scholars and jurists.66 Contemporary state
constitutionalism was born.
Interestingly, regular reviews of state constitutional progress in
symposia have revealed a vibrant, sophisticated, and growing scholarly
debate on state constitutional theory as the years and decades since Justice
Brennan's article have passed.67 This academic enthusiasm and dedication
62. While states certainly had their own constitutions before Justice Brennan's article was
published, the courts seem to have paid little attention to them as restraints on state power. See Hans
A. Linde, E Pluribus - Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165, 174 (1984)
(explaining that gag orders, public prayer, and other highly dubious infringements of individual
liberty were tolerated and enforced by state courts when those courts were restrained only by their
state constitutions, before the Federal Bill of Rights was incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment). In this sense, Justice Brennan's article was an "awakening" and not a "revival,"
because there was virtually no vestigial state constitutionalism to restore. But see Abrahamson,
supra note 5, at 1144-47 (arguing that 19th century state courts did engage in state constitutional
interpretation and blaming, among other things, federalization of criminal procedure rights for the
later decline in state constitutionalism). Naturally, advocates of state constitutionalism may prefer to
emphasize the restoration of a glorious past than confront the difficulties inherent in establishing, for
the first time, a new field of jurisprudence.
63. Brennan, supra note 1, at 501-02.
64. See Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: "Converse-1983"" in Context, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1229, 1244 (1994) (criticizing Justice Brennan's 1977 view of federalism and states' capacity
to protect individual rights as "weak").
65. See Hans A. Linde, Without "Due Process "-Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L.
REV. 125, 182 (1970) (arguing that the state constitution should be the first line of defense for civil
liberties, not the federal Fourteenth Amendment).
66. See Robert F. Williams, Justice Brennan, the New Jersey Supreme Court, and State
Constitutions: The Evolution of a State Constitutional Consciousness, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 763, 765
(1998) (describing Justice Brennan's influence on state constitutionalism, its advocates and critics
alike).
67. For example, the law reviews at Rutgers-Camden, Touro, and Albany law schools (among
remain unmatched by the judiciary. Empirical work revealing persistent
failure by many state courts to join the revolution68 has been met with
scholarly apologia explaining that the phenomenon has not reached
widespread practice because of gaps in legal education, 69 renewing
exhortations to the courts to get with the program,7° and redoubling efforts to
refine scholarly theories of state constitutionalism to make them more
persuasive to courts.71 In this Article, I argue that the time has come to stop
showing why state courts should give strong independent interpretations to
their constitutions and start explaining why they actually do not.72 I attempt
to show that even the best of these scholarly arguments are unlikely to be
persuasive in state courts, at least not consistently, although Part V will
argue that this inevitably inconsistent response by the courts is normatively
attractive. 73 For now, I introduce some of the leading arguments that thirty
years of scholarly work has produced.
A. Academic Arguments for Vigorous State Constitutionalism
Perhaps the most controversial of these arguments for state
constitutionalism is the idea that state constitutions are the repositiories of
the authoring community's fundamental values,74 exactly parallel to the
popular conception of the Federal Constitution as a source of morality as
well as law. In this view, the people of each state have developed a
"character" derived from the state's unique history, geography, economy,
and relationship to the rest of the country.75 State courts themselves have
others) have all run regularly recurring state constitutional studies. See, e.g., Robert F. Williams,
Introduction (Seventeenth Annual Issue on State Constitutional Law), 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1073 (2005);
Annual New York State Constitutional Issue, 21 TouRo L. REv. iii (2005); Albany Law Review,
State Constitutional Commentary, http://lawreview.als.edu/scc.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
68. See Schapiro, supra note 5, at 396-97 (noting that although most scholars argue for
autonomous state constitutionalism, state courts tend to be deferential to federal sources of law).
69. See Jennifer Friesen, State Courts as Sources of Constitutional Law: How to Become
Independently Wealthy, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1065, 1086 (1997) (noting that when it comes to
the development of rich state constitutionalism, "[t]he law schools could do much more to help").
70. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, The State and Federal Courts in Governance: Vive la Difference!,
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273, 1287-88 (2005) (urging state courts, on state autonomy grounds, to
abandon federal doctrines of justiciability not found in the text of state constitutions and not
compelled by prudence).
71. See, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, Ordinary and Enhanced Rational Basis Review in the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court: A Preliminary Investigation, 69 ALB. L. REV. 415, 416
(2006) (developing a complex and subtle analysis of Massachusetts state equal protection doctrine as
a response to seeming inconsistency in state constitutional interpretation).
72. See infra notes 164-87 and accompanying text.
73. See infra Part V.
74. Shaw, supra note 7, at 1028.
75. See, e.g., Margaret H. Marshall, "Wise Parents Do Not Hesitate to Learn from Their
Children:" Interpreting State Constitutions in an Age of Global Jurisprudence, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1633, 1641 (2004) (describing state constitutions as "the product of the democratic aspirations of
people united by a highly localized culture and history"); Ronald L. Nelson, Welcome to the "Last
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sometimes adopted this justification for construing a state constitutional
clause differently from its parallel federal provision.76 As a practical matter,
this approach may have developed as a partial response to the paucity of
historical information about state constitutions.77 Even newer constitutions
may lack enough legislative history to justify application of a broad text to a
new fact pattern. More theoretically, the state "character" advocates argue
that the people of a state have encoded their deepest collective values in the
state constitution and a state court that fails to give adequate attention to the
unique state culture is failing to give a true, full meaning to the
constitution.7 8 This approach carries echoes of Ronald Dworkin's concept
of legal coherency, wherein the judge's task is to read each aspect of law
such that it best fits and justifies the rest of the entire legal corpus. 79 If state
constitutions reflect the core values of the founding community, then even
seemingly trivial clauses (like New York's regulation of ski trails) 80 should
be read as if they contributed an essential part to the coherent and profound
moral lesson issuing from the people of the state to its government.8 The
Frontier, " Professor Gardner: Alaska's Independent Approach to State Constitutional
Interpretation, 12 ALASKA L. REv. 1, 5-8 (arguing that geographical and historical features of
Alaska provide support for a unique constitutional interpretation there); Peter R. Teachout, Against
the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review Symposium on the Revolution in State
Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REV. 13, 35 (1988) (arguing for robust independent state
constitutionalism because it is "expressive of that state's own particular constitutional heritage");
Shaw, supra note 7, at 1028 (advancing "primacy" as an interpretive theory that permits states to
express their own values rather than the "lowest common denominator of broadly shared national
values").
76. See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975) (applying state constitutional right
to privacy to invalidate a marijuana-possession conviction, explaining that the Alaskan "territory and
now state has traditionally been the home of people who prize their individuality and who have
chosen to settle or to continue living here in order to achieve a measure of control over their own
lifestyles which is now virtually unattainable in many of our sister states").
77. See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 169,
198 (1983) (noting the frequent difficulty in accessing historical information about the drafting of
state constitutions); Claudia Burton & Andrew Grade, A Legislative History of the Oregon
Constitution of 1857, 37 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 469, 529-30 (2001) (noting the absence of legislative
history or debate about the Oregon Constitution's takings clause).
78. James A. Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and the Interpretation of
State Constitutions: A Case Study in Constitutional Argument, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1219, 1221 (1998).
79. RONALD DwoRKmN, LAw's EMPIRE 380 (1986) (describing the constitutional law approach
of "Hercules," the ideal judge who integrates all aspects of law to best explain the law and
institutional structures of society).
80. See N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § I (regulating the number, length, and width of ski trails on state
forest lands); John S. Banta, Whiteface Mountain Ski Center: Land Use Policy and Direction, 26 VT.
L. REv. 641, 644-47 (2002) (describing the history and environmental context of state constitutional
restraints on skiing at the Lake Placid Olympics and other venues within state conservation lands).
81. The ease of amending most state constitutions may tend to increase the number of
administrative-type constitutional provisions. Similarly, the Federal Constitution is effectively
concept of a people entrusting its collective ethos to a constitutional
document resonates so closely with the common conception of what the
Federal Constitution is,82 and what any other constitution ought to be, that it
has remained attractive to state constitutionalists. Interestingly, the federal
courts, perhaps through some combination of federal convention and
humility, have endorsed the concept of states as culturally distinct polities, at
least in some circumstances.83
A second argument for strong state constitutionalism is the famously
liberal Justice Brennan's original point that giving greater weight to state
constitutions necessarily means giving greater protection to individual
liberties, and state courts should do so unapologetically.84 One leading
scholar has even defined New Judicial Federalism as "the phenomenon
where state courts interpret their state constitutions to provide more rights
than are recognized by the United States Supreme Court under the Federal
Constitution. ' '85  While this explicitly ideology-tainted position has faced
resistance from many quarters, it remains the match that lit the modem state
constitutionalist fire, and its heat persists.86
(albeit not formally) amended by U.S. Supreme Court decisions straying far afield from the plain
text. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669
(1999) (explaining that sovereign immunity extends well beyond the Constitutional text, saying
"[tihough its precise terms bar only federal jurisdiction over suits brought against one State by
citizens of another State or foreign state, we have long recognized that the Eleventh Amendment
accomplished much more"); see also Peter J. Galie & Christopher Bopst, Changing State
Constitutions: Dual Constitutionalism and the Amending Process, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 27,
28-29 (1996) (explaining that, in many areas of law, the functional equivalent of the state
constitutional amendment at the federal level is the judicial opinion). Supreme Court decisions, even
Constitutional decisions, can be just as technical and seemingly trivial as any state constitutional
amendment. See, e.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S. Ct. 1735, 1741 (2006) (describing the probate
exception to federal court jurisdiction, a doctrine not "compelled by the text of the Constitution or
federal statute" but "stemming in large measure from misty understandings of English legal
history").
82. See Gardner, supra note 78, at 1221 (noting that "the technique of appealing to American
character seems to be a settled feature of American constitutional argument"); Bruce Ackerman,
Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 453-55 (1989) (arguing that European
values have overtaken scholars' perception of American constitutionalism and advocating the
restoration of a constitutionalism more grounded in national culture). But see Earl M. Maltz, James
Gardner and the Idea of State Constitutionalism, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1019, 1021 (1993) (arguing that
the Federal Constitution was not drafted as a collection of grand moral values, but rather as an act of
political expediency as much as any state constitution).
83. See, e.g., Miller v. Califomia, 413 U.S. 15, 31 (1973) (rejecting a national community
standard for obscenity and permitting the establishment of state-wide standards, even for a state as
large and diverse as California).
84. Brennan, supra note 1, at 495, 501-02.
85. Robert F. Williams, The New Judicial Federalism Takes Root in Arkansas, 58 ARK. L. REv.
883, 883 (2006).
86. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 706-07 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
for expanded state constitutional autonomy as a greater protection for individual liberties,
notwithstanding Justice Stevens's ordinary support for a vigorous federal government).
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A basic aspect of American federalism, as expressed through the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause,87 compels states to offer their citizens no
fewer rights than the Federal Constitution demands.8 8 While it is true that in
a few areas of law, this greater liberty may be more closely associated with
"conservative" political ideology than with the political left,89 the rights-
enhancing tilt of independent state constitutionalism favors "liberal" results
overall.90 The contention that state courts are free to (and usually do) adopt
the federal floor for themselves as a matter of state constitutional law does
not make state constitutionalism conservative; it simply is not invariably
more liberal than the Federal Supreme Court.9' If you are offered a bet
where you can never lose money but once in a while you will win some, you
have gotten a good deal. Likewise, a system that can be more liberal but can
never be more conservative works as a ratchet. For judges who favor such
results, state constitutionalism offers an opportunity to prevent the federal
courts' retreat from rights protection from reaching their states.92 This
approach stands in stark contrast to state constitutionalism prior to the
Federal Supreme Court's incorporation of the Federal Bill of Rights as
applicable to the states, when the states offered less liberty protection in a
variety of areas than they would later be required to provide by the Warren
Court federal floor.93
87. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
88. Of course, state courts remain free to interpret their constitutions as falling below the federal
rights-protection floor, but only so long as they decline to give effect to that result. To argue for a
state constitutional holding different from federal law, then, is necessarily to argue for a greater
regime of rights protection than federally required.
89. State constitutions may track more conservative/libertarian positions on issues of private
property rights, economic regulation of business, affirmative action, and gun control, for example.
Of course, if there is a countervailing federal interest in regulation, it will prevail; a state constitution
could not effectively protect the liberty to carry automatic weapons if the same weapons are banned
by federal law.
90. But cf DWORKIN, supra note 79, at 358 (criticizing the idea that the conventional left/right
political spectrum applies to judging).
91. Contra Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State Court "Revolution," 74
JUDICATURE 190, 194 (1991) (describing as "conservative" state court decisions that adopt federal
reasoning under the state constitution).
92. But cf Sunstein, supra note 57, at 14 (complaining that considerable constitutional
innovation at the state level has failed to yield real results improving conditions for the poor).
93. See TARR, supra note 52, at 178 (observing that, prior to the Burger Court's retreat from
Fourteenth Amendment-incorporated federal civil liberties, "[s]tate courts had never developed a
body of state civil-liberties law"); Theodore W. Ruger, New Federalism: Introduction, 16 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 89, 91 (2004) (describing states historic resistance to liberal national programs like
"emancipation, anti-discrimination laws, [and] wage-and-hour legislation," while states supported
right-wing agendas like "slavery, segregation, child labor and underenforcement of domestic
violence laws"). Contra Robert K. Fitzpatrick, Note, Neither Icarus nor Ostrich: State Constitutions
as an Independent Source of Individual Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1833, 1835-38 (2004) (arguing
Independent state constitutionalism may also be justified by a
"laboratories of democracy" argument.94  This approach, reminiscent of
Darwinian evolution, suggests that state courts should give independent
readings to their state constitutions to create diversity among states.95 By
favoring diversity over uniformity, the argument goes, state courts
strengthen the country by providing living examples of which constitutional
policies succeed and which fail. 9 6 When one state looks to its neighbor and
realizes far too many crimes are going unpunished because the neighbor has
adopted an over-protective interpretation of its state constitutional privacy
clause, the observing state will wisely refrain from making the same
mistake. For this experimentalism to work, states must engage in
discernibly different constitutional jurisprudence yet have internal social
situations sufficiently similar to support the comparison.97
A more restrained argument for robust state constitutionalism is taken
directly from the Federal Supreme Court's prudential principle that sub-
constitutional laws should be construed first to avoid interpreting the
Constitution unless logically necessary.98 Under this theory, state high
courts should follow the same principle: if the state constitution prohibits a
challenged government action, the court need not reach the Federal
Constitution at all, and out of a sense of judicial restraint should avoid
Constitutional dicta.99 This position strongly supports the "primacy" theory
of state constitutionalism because it requires the court to confront the state
constitutional claim first, even if the claim fails.'00 A secondary advantage
of this approach is the creation of a large body of state constitutional
precedents, which in turn are then available to advocates and courts to
expand and refine state constitutional doctrines. Some scholars view the
that state constitutions were effective protections of individual rights until the U.S. Supreme Court
began holding states to federal standards through Fourteenth Amendment incorporation of federal
rights, whereupon states abandoned independent state constitutionalism).
94. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(noting that a "[s]tate may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country").
95. See James A. Gardner, The "States-As-Laboratories" Metaphor in State Constitutional Law,
30 VAL. U. L. REv. 475, 486-87 (1996) (explaining how judges use the "labortories metaphor" to
justify reading the Federal Constitution narrowly and state constitutions broadly).
96. See id. at 486.
97. See id. at 481. Cf Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on
the Process of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 640, 642 (1999) (challenging the
notion that constitutionalism necessarily has utilitarian, policy-optimizing purposes and so
questioning the usefulness of comparativism).
98. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1935) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (describing principles of constitutional avoidance); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla.
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (applying canon of
construction that laws should be read to avoid deciding possible unconstitutionality).
99. See Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 57, at 998-99 (attacking the California Supreme
Court for engaging in constitutional dicta).
100. For a discussion on the "primacy approach" see supra note 44.
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production of a corpus of state constitutional precedents as itself a
worthwhile project.'0 '
A related argument employed by commentators in support of vigorous
state constitutionalism is similarly deferential to the moral authority of the
Federal Constitution. Under this theory, state courts should engage in
independent interpretations of their own constitutions, but should feel free to
borrow liberally from federal precedents and federal concepts, all for the
sake of promoting a broader national dialogue on constitutional rights.1
0 2
Paul Kahn and James Gardner are the leading expositors of this approach,
both arguing that state constitutions offer courts a haven to engage with
principles of generic American constitutionalism freely without being tied to
the United States Supreme Court's procrustean doctrines.'0 3 To his credit,
Professor Gardner, especially, emphasizes that state constitutional structural
decisions are just as significant as individual rights decisions for building the
state as an effective check on federal authority.' °4 This argument has two
major advantages: it comports with traditional understandings of the federal
union, under which both state and federal governments exist to check and
balance each other in the name of the people's liberty, and it comes closest
to explaining state courts' continued reliance on Supreme Court writings as
the starting point (and often ending point) for state constitutional analysis.
Judicial efficiency, too, may best be served by consistently independent
state constitutionalism. Cases resolved on state bases alone cannot face
review in the Supreme Court because the results are supported by an
adequate and independent state ground, sparing that court and the parties the
time and expense of further appellate litigation.'0 5 The threat of Supreme
101. See, e.g., Friesen, supra note 69, at 1086 (arguing for the creation of "wealth" in the form of
a deep body of state constitutional precedents).
102. GARDNER, supra note 2, at 254-57 (arguing that state courts need not interpret duplicative
constitutional provisions identically to federal courts, but that they may rely on "Supreme Court
rulings as a point of reference").
103. See Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L.
REv. 1147, 1148 (1993) (arguing that state courts should seek to interpret a transcendent "American
constitutionalism" more than unique state sources); GARDNER, supra note 2, at 253-67 (arguing that
state courts can use state constitutions to engage the federal government on questions of national
constitutionalism). For a discussion of the powerful influence of Gardner's 2005 book on state
constitutionalism scholarship, see Rossi, supra note 3.
104. GARDNER, supra note 2, at 260-65 (describing how state constitutional structural decisions
also affect the state's capacity to negotiate and resist federal encroachments).
105. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983) ("Respect for the independence of state
courts, as well as avoidance of rendering advisory opinions, have been the cornerstones of this
Court's refusal to decide cases where there is an adequate and independent state ground.");
Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 57, at 996-97 (noting the Federal Supreme Court's incapacity
to review state court decisions founded on an independent state ground).
Court review of state court decisions resting on a lockstep analysis or just
federal law is real, even when the state supreme court interprets federal law
to restrain other branches of state government in a manner that would be
perfectly permissible if conducted under the authority of the state
constitution. 10 6 If the state supreme court later rejects the federal reasoning
on remand, the Federal Supreme Court's decision loses all relevance to the
actual parties to the controversy that was once before it.' °7
There is, finally, an argument more in tune with the simple philosophy
of the mountaineer George Leigh Mallory: state courts should give meaning
to state constitutions because they are there.'0 8 As commentators are fond of
pointing out, state judges have taken oaths to uphold their state
constitutions. 0 9 Stubborn and exclusive reliance on decisions of the Federal
Supreme Court, rather than a good-faith independent examination of the
state constitution, is analogous to an impermissible delegation of authority.
State judges are no more authorized to permit federal judges to define state
law for them than they would be authorized to permit a law professor' (or
any other stranger) to write the court's opinion. This approach says nothing
about how state courts should interpret their constitutions, so long as the
interpretation is centered on the state's own law rather than that of another
jurisdiction.
B. Criticisms of the Autonomous State Constitutional Theories
Each of the arguments for a consistently autonomous state
constitutionalism has its accompanying critiques. The first theory, premised
on the states' fundamental values, may be the weakest. Professor Gardner
106. See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2520-21 (2006) (reversing, where jurisdiction
depended on the lower court's application of solely federal law, a state supreme court judgment
prohibiting the state from conducting an execution). Cf Robert F. Williams, The Claus von Bulow
Case: Chutzpah and State Constitutional Law?, 26 CoNN. L. REV. 711, 718 (1994) (describing the
failure of the state to obtain certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court after it lost a criminal case in the
state supreme court based on both federal and state constitutional law).
107. See, e.g., People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26, 30 (Ill. 2006) (rejecting a Federal Supreme
Court decision based on federal law in favor of a new state constitutional analysis that maintained
the result previously reversed by the Federal Supreme Court).
108. Climbing Mount Everest is Work for Supermen, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1923, at XI I (quoting
Mallory as justifying his attempt to climb Mt. Everest with the line, "Because it's there").
109. See, e.g., Abrahamson, supra note 5, at 1168 (describing the lockstep approach as violating
"the state judge's oath to support the state constitution"); James D. Heiple & Kraig James Powell,
Presumed Innocent: The Legitimacy of Independent State Constitutional Interpretation, 61 ALB. L.
REV. 1507, 1513 (1998) (arguing that a state judge breaks her oath and her duty to her state by
failing to interpret the state constitution independently of the Federal Supreme Court). On the
normative force of oaths generally, see Nadine Farid, Oath and Affirmation in the Court: Thoughts
on the Power of a Sworn Promise, 40 NEw ENG. L. REV. 555 (2006).
110. Cf Leslie W. Abramson, The Judicial Ethics of Ex Parte and Other Communications, 37
HouS. L. REV. 1343, 1345 n.8 (2000) (describing disciplinary proceedings against a judge who
permitted law professors to draft some of his opinions).
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has demonstrated, with devastating precision, how the state populations
from whom these fundamental values are supposedly drawn are too
internally diverse, externally homogeneous, and mobile to sustain truly
independent state cultures with corresponding differences in profound, core
values. 11 As a result, reaching state constitutional decisions on the basis of
a state's innate "character," the theory Professor Gardner calls "Romantic
Subnationalism," is misguided at best.'12 For example, according to one
seemingly plausible stereotype, the people of Vermont live in a rural,
mountainous state historically isolated from its neighbors, with a cultural
and political history to match. The state supreme court might use such
"facts" of pop anthropology to support an independent state constitutional
interpretation, rejecting the position urging uniformity with the other
states. 13 Yet, real Vermonters do not match this essentialized image of a
laconic lone farmer. They watch the same advertisements and television
shows and movies from New York and Hollywood that the rest of the
country enjoys; they prefer the same national household brands, they day-
trade in the same Wall Street companies, and they dress in the same national
fashions. Is a Vermonter who feels deeply interconnected to other states and
who cares greatly about what people in the other states think any less of a
participant in the state constitutional culture than the stereotypical Green
Mountain shepherd? Consider this stereotype: everyone knows that red-state
Texans are conservative libertarians with unimpeachable devotion to
frontier-style laissez-faire economics." 4 Nevertheless, a state constitutional
decision based on that characterization would be irrational, in light of a
survey showing that nearly two-thirds of Texans support New Deal-style
government-provided full employment." 5
Reliance on Romantic Subnationalism, aside from lacking empirical
support, fails to uphold the important judicial responsibility to provide equal
111. See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 53-79. But see Pam Belluck, The Not-So United States, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2006, § 4, at 4 (describing an apparently growing cultural divide among different
states).
112. GARDNER, supra note 2, at 21.
113. Cf Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 885 (Vt. 1999) (describing Vermont's law permitting first-
cousin marriages as part of a tradition of non-uniformity).
114. See Texas Politics § 2.1, Low Taxes, Low Services Political Culture, http://texaspolitics.laits.
utexas.edu/html/cult/0201 html (last visited Oct. 12, 2006) ("The 'low taxes, low services' credo has
endured across generations of both Democratic and Republican dominance of state government.").
115. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 18 ("In 1998, 64 percent of Texans agreed that 'the government
should see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job."') (citation omitted). Even a
reactionary Texas politician, then a state supreme court justice, has denied that Texas's constitutional
history is distinctive. See John Cornyn, The Roots of the Texas Constitution: Settlement to
Statehood, 26 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1089, 1090 (1995) (describing the Texas constitution as "more
imitative than experimental").
justice under the law. The theory carries the insidious threat of cultural
imperialism: there is the risk that the politically connected lawyers who
become judges on high courts, who tend to come from the dominant racial
and religious groups within a state,1 6 look out from their "marble palace"
'
"
17
and view the interwoven strands of power and resistance from a sharply
confined perspective.18 A high court decision declaring, for example, that
the people of its state have a long and proud history of hunting in the woods,
a cultural tradition that finds expression in the state constitution's protection
of the right to bear arms, sounds innocent enough. Sure, it seems to remind
everyone that vegetarians-Hindus, hippies, and the like-stand outside the
state's "proud tradition," and so are not in the core of people the state court
considers itself bound to protect. Much worse is the other side of the legal
history associated with the hunting tradition, the side state elites are unlikely
to recall: the legal exclusion of African-Americans from the gun-toting
culture during the time when right to bear arms clauses encouraged whites to
own guns as a means of maintaining racial superiority." 9  The court's
privileging of gun-owning culture silently (and accidentally) perpetuates the
racial subordination that accompanied that culture. 120  Of course, in every
case decided by a court, one side loses. The difference with a case decided
on the basis of Romantic Subnationalism, however, is that the losing side is
deemed not just legally wrong, but culturally wrong; the loser is held to lack
the fundamental values underlying the constitutional decision that make
state citizens full members of the state culture.'
2
'
In a myriad of other areas, the same risk presents itself. The high court
judges might tend to see, in their constitution, only those strands of state
culture that support the social and political status quo, rather than giving
voice to the constituents of state culture that include alternative paths and
visions of the good society. That dialectic, between the status quo and an
alternate imagined community, is a central component of democracy.122 It is
116. See John B. Wefmg, State Supreme Court Justices: Who Are They?, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV.
47, 52, 54 (1997) (noting that most state high court judges are white male Protestants).
117. Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants: "Inferior" Judges and the Task of
Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV. 843, 844 (1993) (referring to the U.S. Supreme
Court as a "marble palace (or tomb inhabited by the living dead)").
118. Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (complaining that elite
judges impose their own view of national culture on the divergent views of the public).
119. See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-
Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 326 (1991) (describing the history of gun law as
intimately connected with the maintenance of white power at the expense of African-Americans).
120. See id. at 335-38; see also David C. Williams, Constitutional Tales of Violence: Populists,
Outgroups, and the Multicultural Landscape of the Second Amendment, 74 TUL. L. REV. 387, 405
(1999).
121. Cf Schapiro, supra note 5, at 394 (arguing that an important function of constitutions is "to
counter, rather than to embody, preexisting identities").
122. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 4-5 (1996)
(arguing that unquestioning acceptance of existing structural institutions and power arrangements
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the nature of every constitutional case, every political controversy, every
battle in Justice Scalia's "kulturkampf."'' 23  When a state institution like a
supreme court expressly favors only the dominant branch of that
conversation, cultural minorities are made even more "discrete and
insular"124 and lacking in the power to offer the community a new political
direction. Civic life stagnates.
Furthermore, there is little reason to suspect that citizens of a state feel
any consistent sense of belonging to a state constitutional community, or
even that they are aware states have constitutions.125 "Most Americans don't
give a damn about federalism," one political scientist has modestly
explained. 26  Even those state courts that reach a decision based on the
polity's "fundamental values" may be reluctant to carry that cultural
observation to its logical conclusion in other cases. For example, if "the
people" of West Virginia value their privacy more than most, such that a
police search of a car is unreasonable, does that imply that the West Virginia
character would also rebel at a registry of sex offenders? If the result in the
first case is based on the amorphous nature of a stereotype, little principled
rationale is left to guide, and restrain, a court acting in the next case.
In short, Romantic Subnationalism is objectively faulty to the extent it
relies on a unique state character because state populations are too internally
divergent, and too alike across borders, to exhibit such character traits.
27
Cultures might vary across regions more than across states, as Patrick Baude
has suggested, 28 but resting a state constitutional conclusion on a regional
culture seems somewhat inconsistent with the concept of state constitutions
"suppress[es] a crucial internal dialectic in the material of desires and intuitions: the conflict between
those of our tendencies that take the established order of social life for granted and those that, as
longing, fantasy, or resistance, rebel against that order").
123. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
125. See Cornell W. Clayton, Toward a Theory of the Washington Constitution, 37 GONZ. L. REV.
41, 42 (2002) (confirming the widespread apathy and ignorance about state constitutions among
Americans).
126. See R. Shep Melnick, The Federal Safeguards of Politics, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 847, 847
(2005) (arguing that most voters care about reaching the optimal policy result, not which level of
government should best deal with the issue).
127. See Schapiro, supra note 5, at 393 (describing the community model theory as giving "rise to
pointless, indeed often silly, debates about state character"); Linde, supra note 62, at 194
("Federalism divides our laws along state lines, but those lines do not match divisions in American
society. They do not correspond to this nation's ethnic and religious diversity nor to our bitter
disputes over changing customs.").
128. See Patrick Baude, Interstate Dialogue in State Constitutional Law, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 835,
836-37 (1997) (arguing that constitutional "epics" do transcend state borders, but can be located well
below the national level, in regions and related states).
as enshrining the unique values of the authoring jurisdiction.1 29 The theory
is normatively lacking for elevating the version of the state's culture
perceived and celebrated by legal elites over the less rosy or less
"mainstream" components of the state community. 30
The second robust state constitutionalism argument, advocacy for
expanded protection of individual liberties, establishes a liberal ratchet: the
more state constitutions are given independent meaning, the more
restrictions on state action will ensue.'31 While appealing to supporters of
increasing individual liberty and expanding state obligations, 132 this
approach carries the somewhat obvious flaw that conservative judges will
not accept such a theory. One student commentator's study of the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals reveals how a state jurist opposed to greater
rights for criminal defendants bitterly opposed his colleagues' arguments for
a robust state constitutionalism.133  Proponents of state constitutionalism
tend to acknowledge, but underestimate, the force of the liberal ratchet. 34
While some leading commentators from Justice Brennan onward solve the
liberal ratchet problem more or less by embracing its liberty-enhancing
teleology,135 others have resisted such a legal realism approach to judicial
129. See Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure Constitutionalism: The New York
State Court of Appeals' Quest for Principled Decisionmaking, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 235 (1996)
("[S]tate constitutional discourse will always be 'impoverished' and inadequate because states are
not unique communities with their own fundamental character and values.").
130. See Shauna Van Praagh, The Education of Religious Children: Families, Communities and
Constitutions, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1343, 1386 (1999) ("Frameworks that operate at political,
constitutional and state law levels need to be informed by small everyday stories of real people,
rather than the other way around.").
131. See Paul S. Hudnut, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: The Case for Judicial
Restraint, 63 DENV. U. L. REV. 85, 88 (1985) (explaining that "state constitutional interpretation is
skewed" to provide only the same or greater liberty than that required by the Federal Constitution).
132. See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, The New Jersey Constitution: Positive Rights, Common Law
Entitlements, and State Action, 69 ALB. L. REV. 553 passim (2006) (celebrating the New Jersey
Supreme Court's reliance on independent state constitutionalism to expand social and economic
rights as well as traditional civil liberties).
133. See Jessica L. Schneider, High Court Study, Breaking Stride: The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals' Rejection of the Lockstep Approach 1988-1998, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1593, 1599-1620 (1999)
(demonstrating empirically how the court's tendency to imbue the state constitution with
independent meaning ebbed and flowed with the political ideology of the judges).
134. See Linzer, supra note 21, at 1576-79 (arguing that because state constitutions could protect
conservative speech such as that of abortion protesters blocking clinics, or strike down liberal
economic regulations, or ban abortion as a matter of state due process if federal constitutional
protection for abortion were removed, the constitutions are not "liberal ratchets"); Robert 0.
Dawson, State-Created Exclusionary Rules in Search and Seizure: A Study of the Texas Experience,
59 TEX. L. REV. 191, 193 (1981) (acknowledging that the Supreme Court search and seizure limits in
the Warren Court era went further than many state courts preferred, but that subsequent federal
retreat from privacy protection led state courts to turn to their own constitutions to restrain the
police).
135. See, e.g., GARDNER, supra note 2, at 125 (positing the purpose of state authority as being to
check national encroachments on individual liberty).
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decision-making. 36 From the perspective of a judge, however, there is no
avoiding the basic fact that a case disposed of on state constitutional grounds
will almost always be politically liberal. Often, these decisions will not just
be liberal, but also counter-majoritarian because the constitution would be
reached only if the legislature has declined to provide the right in
question. 137  While a state constitution can, theoretically, be interpreted as
providing less protection than the Federal Constitution, so long as the lesser
protection is not given effect, such a conclusion is necessarily dictum.
38
The practical difficulty of serious state constitutional interpretation
associated with inadequate legislative records, and the lack of meaningful
precedent, means that a conservative judge who wants to express her pique
with a rights-protective federal decision by interpreting the state constitution
below the federal floor must do an extraordinary amount of work to develop
that dictum.139 Few state high court judges have the luxury of enough time
to undertake such a pointless project. More frequently, conservative courts
that wish to avoid providing greater liberty than the Federal Constitution
requires may simply adopt the federal standards as their own under the state
constitution. 40 The approach permits as conservative a result as federal law
permits, while still letting the court appear to endorse the new judicial
federalism favored by scholars.'
The major exception to the liberal ratchet problem is intrastate structural
law. Here, the difference between individual rights cases and structural
cases does matter. 42 Conservative judges who dislike legislative spending
136. See Barry Latzer, Whose Federalism? Or, Why "Conservative" States Should Develop Their
State Constitutional Law, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1399, 1404-05 (1998) (arguing that state
constitutionalism need not result in more leftist policies).
137. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health,798 N.E.2d 941, 953 (Mass. 2003) (reaching
state constitutional question only after deterimining that statutory analysis would not provide
plaintiffs with the relief sought). Note that some constitutional decisions may yet be majoritarian,
because by coincidence the result might be consistent with what a majority of the population wants
(despite the substance of the challenged statutes).
138. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text
139. Cf Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1307-08 (1999)
(arguing that federalism arguments have often been used as cover for more ends-oriented
jurisprudence, and observing that "[j]udges can be expected to decide ideologically before adhering
to a neutral principle of federalism").
140. See Latzer, supra note 91, at 190-91 (revealing that most state high court decisions founded
on "independent" state constitutional law actually track federal precedents and results).
141. See id. at 197 (noting that "conservative" state constitutionalism pleases the state courts'
constituents: the U.S. Supreme Court likes being followed; the law-and-order political forces get the
result they want; and the court itself gets to feel part of the "judicial mainstream" of autonomous
constitutionalism).
142. Cf GARDNER, supra, note 2 (arguing that in most circumstances, the difference between
individual rights cases and structural cases is negligible).
are free to interpret their state constitutional line-item veto clauses
generously in favor of a parsimonious governor, for example. 143 Similarly, a
conservative court favoring the vigorous exercise of executive authority
might be unusually deferential to state agencies on state constitutional
separation of powers grounds. On the other hand, if the legislature were
more conservative perhaps the agencies would receive less deference.
Collectively, structural decisions tending to favor the state institutions more
favorable to conservative ideology might make a bigger difference in the
lives of ordinary state citizens than the rights-protective liberal decisions do.
This structural exception to the liberal ratchet problem suggests that state
courts should feel less restrained in giving independent constructions to state
constitutions in this area, without undue deference to federal opinions.
44
Nevertheless, even in structural cases, where no federal parallel is apparent
in the constitutional text, state courts have sometimes declined to perform
truly independent analysis.
145
The third argument for independent state constitutionalism, the
"laboratories of democracy" position, has the main weakness of treating the
state constitution as instrumentalist, that is, for the benefit of other states.
As Professor Gardner has pointed out, a state court conducting constitutional
interpretation has no incentive to make itself different from its neighbors just
for the sake of experimentation. 146 Instead, its sole incentive is to discover
the best meaning of the constitutional clause leading to the best policy for
the state's own citizens. 147 Innovation for the sake of learning whether the
state's policy or a competing one works best turns the state constitution into
a gamble, a result unlikely to appeal to cautious state judges. Furthermore,
as Professor Gardner also explains, states are not fungible. 148  A
constitutional interpretation about the balance between privacy rights and
law enforcement that satisfies the people of one state tells us nothing about
how to set the balance in another state.149  The greater the difference in
143. See Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 1171, 1174 (1993)
(describing state constitutional structure as permitting a wide range of power balancing between the
legislative and executive branches).
144. State judges are less open to accusations of illegitimate judicial activism if their decisions are
not subject to a one-sided political ratchet. Because structural decisions can turn left or right with
equal ease, there is no taint of state constitutionalism being a mask for only one political ideology in
these cases.
145. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 167-68 (Ga. 1981) (following United States
Supreme Court precedent to confirm the existing structural arrangement between the state and local
authorities in the face of a challenge based on the state education clause).
146. See Gardner, supra note 95, at 481-82 (doubting the transferability of sound policy from one
state to another due to differences among the states).
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. Id.
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social and legal practices across state lines, the less useful such comparison
will be. 5°
The federal constitutional avoidance argument, while theoretically
sound and superficially appealing because of its association with judicial
restraint, also fails. Commentators adopting this approach seem to treat the
judicial decision-making process as congruent with the rationale expressed
in the opinion. If a written decision first discusses the state constitution and
then the federal claim, the reader is led to think the judges actually followed
the same order in their deliberations. In fact, judges, like any writers, have
all of the potential arguments to resolve before they present their public
explanation. A state court following the constitutional-avoidance canon of
construction is unlikely to engage in a lengthy and difficult process of state
constitutional interpretation if it realizes all along that the Federal
Constitution disposes of the case (and would therefore make impotent dicta
of the state constitutional work).
Another critique, the "functionalist" approach elaborated by James
Gardner, attacks the leading argument for strong state constitutionalism
today. 5' Under this approach, state courts should engage in "dialogue" with
federal courts about the meaning of an intertextual American
constitutionalism.1 2  Paul Kahn,' Robert Schapiro,'5 4 Robert Williams,'55
and Lawrence Friedman' 1 6 each have different views from Professor
Gardner's, but all agree that a lack of autonomous cultural communities
underlying state constitutions should not prevent state courts from using
their constitutions to justify diverging from Federal Supreme Court
precedents. The difficulty with this approach is, in part, the appearance of
illegitimacy. The public, not knowing (or caring) much about state
constitutions or state high courts,'5 7 sees only a state court refusing to follow
150. See id.
151. See GARDNER supra note 2, at 20.
152. See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 20 (arguing for purposeful interpretation to advance
federalism and "American constitutional discourse").
153. See Kahn, supra note 103, at 1147-48 (arguing for a state-by-state dialogue on the meaning
of the national constitutional values).
154. See Schapiro, supra note 5, at 393 (arguing that state constitutional interpretation may
legitimately rest on an "ideal" constitutional community rather than values of the actual people
living in the state).
155. See Williams, supra note 11, at 223-25 (pointing out that regardless of any underlying
community, state constitutional texts call for independent interpretation).
156. See Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial
Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 112-23 (2000) (arguing for primacy as the best
interpretive approach to state constitutions, regardless of whether states constitute independent
cultural communities).
157. A 1977 national poll sponsored by the National Center for State Courts revealed that 72% of
precedent from "the highest court in the land," and by that refusal,
protecting a disfavored group's rights over the wishes of the electoral
majority. This objection, I believe, could be overcome simply by expanding
the frequency of such decisions. Eventually, the public would come to
understand that state supreme courts have their own responsibility to fulfill
and their own sphere in which to do it.
The remaining arguments for a sustained and consistent state
constitutionalism are the judicial efficiency position and the "oath" approach
which I explain in the following text. The efficiency of avoiding Federal
Supreme Court review, which is increasingly rare in any event, may be
overcome by the savings on judicial resources derived from conducting a
federal analysis alone. State constitutionalism is hard work; not only are the
relevant secondary sources frequently difficult to come by or to interpret, but
there is commonly little instructive precedent to guide the court. In contrast,
federal constitutional precedent is at least plentiful, even if a bit askew from
the legal concerns that should face state courts.158 Judges might believe that
if they can resolve the matter without extra research (research that may end
up futile if the state constitution permits the state action but federal law
prohibits it), so much the better-at least for efficiency purposes.
The oath argument-interpret the state constitution simply "because it's
there and the judge has taken an oath to uphold it"-has strong rhetorical
value, but little persuasive force. If a judge already believes that a state
constitution deserves serious and consistent analysis, then "following her
oath" to give it meaning comes naturally. If the state judge doubts the
legitimacy of state constitutions, or believes a particular case is better
resolved by another source of law, the oath is far too vague a restraint on
judicial power to change the judge's mind. This argument is valuable for
emphasizing the state text-a document that gets short shrift in some of the
pan-constitutionalist theories and jurisprudence. Still, the judicial oath of
office is about good faith belief in the law, not substantive rules of
construction. 
159
Americans believe the following statement to be correct: "Every decision made by a state court can
be reviewed and reversed by the U.S. (United States) Supreme Court." Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari
and the Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REv. 727, 739 n.50 (2001).
158. Federal courts, for example, are inordinately concerned with separation of powers and
holding themselves as a check against the other branches, a concern less directly applicable to the
states. See Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and
Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 657-59 (2000) (pointing out different
institutional concerns between the state and federal courts in interpreting separation of powers
questions).
159. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 41:1-1 (2006) ("I . do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support
the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of New Jersey, and that I will
bear true faith and allegiance to the same and to the Governments established in the United States
and in this State, under the authority of the people. So help me God."); OR. CONST. art. XV § 3
("Every person elected or appointed to any office under this Constitution, shall, before entering on
the duties thereof, take an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution of the United States, and of
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Finally, there is another objection. Academic advocates, like Professor
Kahn, of the "dialogue" approach to state constitutions, whereby state
constitutions are valuable only to the extent they provide a venue for
commenting upon the deeper values common across the nation, sometimes
appear to argue for a generic "American" constitutionalism.160 This theory,
as currently in favor, carries a flavor of the pre-Erie days when courts
believed in a single, discoverable, verifiable Common Law. 6 1  By
dissociating state constitutions from the real communities in which they
operate, regardless of whether those communities are culturally distinct or
not, supporters of generic constitutionalism reject the idea of law as
inexorably attached to the people upon whom it operates. The new "new
federalism" offers a dehumanized, abstract "constitutionalism" without
context or connection to a state's real-life judges, lawyers, and citizens.162
Certainly, the country can benefit from a diversity of voices on the content
of whatever fundamental values we share as Americans; indeed, we do
benefit now from such a diversity, because state courts consider federal
questions, raised under the Federal Constitution, routinely and well. When a
Federal Constitutional issue has percolated up from the state and federal
courts together, the United States Supreme Court steps in, weighs the merits
of the existing decisions from all relevant jurisdictions, and then proceeds to
judgment. State constitutions are entirely superfluous to this type of state-
federal judicial dialogue. While state courts might be persuaded to engage
in the radically deracinated approach currently in academic favor, just as
they were once persuaded to be eager participants in the epic and fruitless
search for the one true common law, the project is ultimately hollow. There
is no there there.163  There can be no constitutionalism without a
constitution, and no consensus on "American constitutionalism" will ever be
this State, and also an oath of office.").
160. Professor Gardner refers to this phenomenon, with disapproval, as "constitutional
universalism." See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 30-32. However, Gardner's own "functional" theory
may not go far enough to make clear that state constitutions are worthy subjects of explication in
their own right, for the states' sake.
161. See Kahn, supra note 103, at 1163 (approving the view of a nineteenth century judge who
saw state constitutionalism as just like other common law subjects, subject to interpretation
"independent of any particular state's formal text, history, and precedents").
162. See Schapiro, supra note 5, at 434 (critiquing Professor Kahn's approach for treating state
constitutional interpretation as divorced from unique state sources of law). But cf Rodriguez, supra
note 5, at 300-01 (arguing for a generic "trans-state constitutionalism" in the area of individual
rights).
163. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937). See Hans A. Linde, State
Constitutions Are Not Common Law: Comments on Gardner's Failed Discourse, 24 RUTGERS L.J.
927 (1993) (rejecting an amorphous state constitutionalism disconnected from specific texts and
local context).
found, no matter how well-reasoned the state courts are in their rebuke of
contemporary Federal Supreme Court decisions. The failure of a universal
common law as a governing principle in American courts teaches us that
much.
C. American Exceptionalism as an Alternate Cause for Inconsistent State
Constitutionalism
While the preceding discussion of various arguments for state
constitutionalism and their counterpoints has been centered on the
theoretical, there is another explanation for why state courts may find a
sustained and consistent state constitutionalism unpalatable. Lately, the
Supreme Court and its watchers have been engaged in an odd debate about
the citation of foreign law in federal decisions.' 64 Opponents of citing
foreign law appear to come from a perspective of "American
Exceptionalism," a broad concept covering the empirical ways in which
America differs from other countries, as well as prescriptive claims that
America has the right to avoid conformance with international norms and a
view of America as "the exceptional nation," a place with "a special and
unique destiny to lead the rest of the world to freedom and democracy.'
165
While some scholars have pointed out positive elements to America's view
of itself as a place uniquely unbound by transnational norms and
conventions, 166 other approaches to American Exceptionalism can carry
connotations of xenophobia 167 or downright lawlessness. 68 Underlying all
American Exceptionalism, both good and bad, is the basic view that the
United States Constitution and system of government are the best in the
world, and that adherence to alternative sources of law risks debasing our
164. See Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern lus Gentium, 119 HARv. L. REv. 129,
129 (2005) (describing the debate over the citation of foreign law in the United States Supreme
Court); see also Paul von Nessen, Is There Anything to Fear in Transnationalist Development of
Law? The Australian Experience, 33 PEPI'P. L. REV. 883, 883-885 (2006) (discussing the debate over
using foreign law to decide federal cases in the United States Supreme Court).
165. Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1582-83 (2006).
166. See Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1483 (2003)
(positing that this country has practiced a "distinctive rights culture" by which certain human rights
are protected more extensively here than anywhere else); Marshall, supra note 75, at 1639-41
(describing the American constitutional democracy as unique and a model for the rest of the world,
with newer and older democracies alike moving closer to the American system).
167. For an example of the view that America should not be influenced by foreign norms, see
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 628 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I do not believe that approval
by 'other nations and peoples' should buttress our commitment to American principles any more
than (what should logically follow) disapproval by 'other nations and peoples' should weaken that
commitment.").
168. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2793-98 (2006) (holding that the American
government's self-created exception to the Geneva Conventions for detainees suspected of terrorism
was not authorized by any law).
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national liberty.' 69  Critics of this worldview complain that the opposite
conclusion is more historically accurate: liberty-enhancing movements have
often been transnational, while American "sovereignty" has been used in law
and culture to oppose liberty-enhancing movements.170  Nevertheless, for
believers in American Exceptionalism, American nationhood depends on a
self-definition based on values and ideology, such that American patriotism
is dissociated from ethnicity or history and tied instead to a near-religious
devotion to the American "creed.,
17 1
Previous scholars of state constitutionalism generally have not studied
the connection between the debate at the federal level on citation of foreign
sources and state constitutional courts' frequent reluctance to deviate from
federal precedent.172  Nevertheless, the link has strong intuitive force as a
potential explanation for state court resistance to the vigorous state
constitutionalism advocated by scholars. After all, state judges take an oath
to support two constitutions, federal and state. 73 To the extent these judges
feel that the United States legal tradition is unique and valuable, they may
privilege it over competing sources of legal authority--even from their own
states. An assertion that foreign law or state law should govern a particular
situation may feel, to judges imbued with a sense of American
Exceptionalism, like an implicit criticism of national law and an unpatriotic
gesture. 174
Even the descriptive and common reference to the "federal floor"
169. Cf FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN xiii (1992) (arguing that
the world is on a march of progress from baser forms of government to the highest form of political
arrangement, liberal democracy).
170. See Resnik, supra note 165, at 1577 ("Time and again, human rights movements are met with
an insistence on America's sovereignty, claimed to entail an entitlement to originality or
lexceptionalism."').
171. See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SwORD 31
(1996); Todd E. Pettys, Our Anticompetitive Patriotism, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1353, 1360 (2006)
(describing parallels between American patriotism and Christianity, including some patriots' belief
in a "divinely ordained" mission for the United States, emphasis on "the importance of soldiers'
blood sacrifices for their country," belief in a fundamental moral text, and faith in the national
government's power to solve seemingly intractable problems). American nationalism has become
such a central ideology in some quarters that one evangelical minister felt obliged to remind the
congregation of his mega-church that "America is not the light of the world and the hope of the
world. The light of the world and the hope of the world is Jesus Christ." Laurie Goodstein,
Disowning Conservative Politics, Evangelical Pastor Rattles Flock, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, § 1,
at 1.
172. But see Martha F. Davis, The Spirit of Our Times: State Constitutions and International
Human Rights, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 359, 374 (2006) (noting an analogy between
federal citation of foreign jurisprudence and state high courts' citation of sister-state decisions).
173. See supra note 159.
174. See Pettys, supra note 171, at 1357-58 (describing the strong emotional bonds Americans
feel toward the national community, in contrast to the weak bonds connecting them to their states).
suggests, perhaps unwittingly, that the Federal Constitution revered by state
judges is inadequate to protect Americans' liberty by itself.7 5 If New
Judicial Federalism is taken seriously, this inadequacy is not amenable to
correction by judicial reinterpretation of federal principles, but is rather an
inadequacy built deep into the structure of the national legal system.
Resorting to state constitutions as a routine and consistent solution to the
under-protection of individual rights under the Federal Constitution forces
state judges to treat the federal document as permanently and structurally
insufficient. This challenge to the ideals embodied in the national structure
may provoke resistance among nationalist/"patriotic" judges on state courts,
just as the suggestion that foreign law could improve American legal rights
has provoked judicial and academic resistance. 176
It is inherent in the judicial temperament to be conservative, in the sense
of following tradition (stare decisis) and mainstream social norms. Law
moves slowly. 177  True innovation in state constitutional interpretation
potentially yields results that seem weird enough to be frightening. In this
way, Professor Unger's description of the positive social sciences is also an
apt description of judicial practice: "The [ ] social sciences dispense with the
idea of structural change altogether, treating basic arrangements and
preconceptions as the cumulative residue of countless past episodes of
problem solving or compromise, or as the outcome of trial-and-error
convergence toward the best available practices. This intellectual
tendency constrains political and legal debate to questions of method and
efficiency, rather than permitting deep transformations of the social
institutions we otherwise take for granted. 17  Some state practices may
already seem extraordinary to those steeped in the federal legal culture: chief
executives who cannot fire their states' own lawyers;180 state prosecutors
175. It is a bedrock principle of Federal Constitutional law that the Federal Constitution was
specifically designed to permit only a limited national government. To the extent the Constitution
permits and provides states the capacity to fill the gaps in liberty protection, federal law was
intended to be incomplete. Still, whether the national protections for specific liberties, like the First
Amendment's protection of free speech or the Fifth Amendment's protection against double
jeopardy, were intended to be incomplete or not remains hotly contested. Indeed, the state courts
that interpret state constitutions in lockstep with federal precedent in these areas are effectively
asserting that the national document is not limited in these respects, but instead provides all the
coverage any American could need. This view may seem more "patriotic" than the alternative state
constitution-centered interpretation, which suggests that the First Amendment is not the strongest,
wisest, or most effective protection of free speech in the world.
176. See supra note 164.
177. See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc. 1 (giving "the law's delay" as an
impetus toward suicide).
178. UNGER, supra note 122, at 3.
179. See id.
180. See, e.g., Justin G. Davids, State Attorneys General and the Client-Attorney Relationship:
Establishing the Power to Sue State Officers, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 365, 365-67 (2005)
(describing the political and legal autonomy of independently elected state attorneys general).
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appointed, in part, by judges;..' or enforceable obligations to provide
welfare to aliens. 8 2 Other institutional reforms implicit in state constitutions
are legally plausible but perhaps are too far afield from "American" national
practices to be politically feasible.1 83  State judges' patriotic devotion to
American national law, coupled with the common juristic unease with
structural reform, 84 suggest that state constitutionalism may appear as an
insidious threat to the "normal," i.e. federal, way of doing things. If the
"American" (legal) way of life is the best in the world, a state judge might
wonder how can that way be improved by application of independent state
constitutionalism?
A host of federal tropes become challenged by true and consistent state
constitutionalism. For example, Americans value the three branches of
government as part of the system of "checks and balances," but Florida
values the State Game and Freshwater Fish Commission as a fully
independent, constitutionally autonomous "branch.', 85 According to federal
judges, the existence of a "case or controversy" is essential to the orderly
and appropriate administration of justice, 86 but several state courts will
occasionally adjudicate a dispute even where the plaintiff has no concrete,
particular injury. 87 States might diverge even more from the federal model
181. See CONN. CONST. art. XXIII (2004) (providing for the appointment of state prosecutors by a
criminal justice commission to include two state trial-court judges); see also Lynne Tuohy, Filling a
Job Born in Politics: Top Prosecutor to Be Chosen Soon, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), July 10,
2006, at BI (describing the history of the Connecticut Chief State's Attorney's office).
182. See, e.g., Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that
the state constitution required equal Medicaid benefits for citizens and legal aliens).
183. See, e.g., Bradley R. Haywood, Note, The Right to Shelter as a Fundamental Interest Under
the New York State Constitution, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 157, 177 (2002) (arguing for
substantially elevated state constitutional protection for a "right to shelter"); Antony B. Klapper,
Comment, Finding a Right in State Constitutions for Community Treatment of the Mentally Ill, 142
U. PA. L. REv. 739, 747 (1993) (acknowledging the widespread political opposition to
deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill and arguing that courts should step in to protect the patients'
rights under the state constitutions).
184. See UNGER, supra note 122, at 189 (criticizing an "idolatrous" devotion to the status quo in
legal and political institutional arrangements and arguing for greater "imagination" in conceiving
and building new arrangements).
185. See Fla. Dep't of Natural Res. v. Fla. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 342 So. 2d 495,
495-97 (Fla. 1977) (describing state constitutional independence of the Commission). See generally
Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance of Federal Norms for State Separation of Powers, 4 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 51, 51-52 (1998) (discussing the different approach to separation of powers in
the states, as contrasted with the federal system).
186. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (describing elements of
federal standing in a separation of powers context); Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions,
37 HARV. L. REv. 1002, 1002-08 (1924) (sharply attacking the idea of using advisory opinions in
constitutional cases as antithetical to Anglo-American jurisprudence).
187. See, e.g., In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 483 A.2d 1078, 1079 (R.I. 1984)
if their judges felt that they could do so without implicitly denigrating the
part of their professional, and personal, identity bound to national loyalty.
The principle of American Exceptionalism may operate as an inhibiting
factor for these judges.
III. THE STATES BEHAVE ERRATICALLY
Critics of state constitutionalism need hardly be convinced that state
courts' talk about constitutionalism is often at odds with their walk about
constitutionalism. 188  The continued efforts by state constitutionalism
proponents to convince state courts to engage in consistently independent
state constitutionalism, however, calls for a renewed illustration of the
futility of this project. In this Part, I will review the state constitutional
decisions of four states over a one year period: Oregon, Washington, New
Jersey, and New Hampshire. I picked these states because each has adopted
a bold declaration of vigorous state constitutionalism, 189 and so are among
the most likely to give strong independent meaning to their state
constitutions. If these states decline to apply that autonomous spirit
consistently, states with lesser commitments to their state constitutions are
even more likely to follow federal precedent or a generic "constitution-in-
the-air."
To conduct my review, I examined state high court decisions from
August 1, 2005 to July 31, 2006. I looked at all cases where the court itself
mentioned a state constitutional claim by using the phrase "state
constitution" or "[the state's name] constitution."' 90 My review leaves out
(delineating circumstances under which the state supreme court must give state officials an advisory
opinion and when doing so is merely permissible); see also ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605,
617 (1989) (holding that state courts need not apply federal standing requirements, even when
considering federal questions); William A. Fletcher, The "Case or Controversy" Requirement in
State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REv. 263, 264-65 (1990) (noting the lack
of traditional standing requirements in state court and arguing that federal standards should apply
when state courts are considering federal questions).
188. For a thorough empirical demonstration of state court fickleness in approaching
constitutional claims, see Gardner, supra note 5, at 778-79, 804.
189. See Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (Or. 1981) (establishing the primacy doctrine as
Oregon law); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (Wash. 1986) (establishing, in line with the
dualism doctrine, "neutral criteria" to guide courts and litigants in deciding when to construe the
state constitution differently from analogous federal clauses); State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 955-56
(N.J. 1982) (following interstitial/supplemental doctrine to reach a result founded on the state
constitution as more protective than the Federal Constitution); State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 351
(N.H. 1983) (establishing the primacy doctrine as New Hampshire law). See generally Stewart G.
Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship
Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEx. L. REv. 977, 983-86 (1985) (describing various state
courts' approaches to independent state constitutionalism).
190. This search process leaves out state high court decisions that did not use those specific
phrases, so it cannot fairly be called all-encompassing. Nevertheless, because I am looking for
examples of where the state courts declined to provide an autonomous constitutional interpretation,
the discovery of such cases even under my limited search strengthens my argument that state courts
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cases where the state constitutional claim may have been briefed but not
explicitly noted by the court in its decision. In surveying these decisions, I
recognize that state high courts will sometimes conform their constitutions
to the Federal Constitution in those states with approaches other than
primacy. However, even the interstitial approach states should typically
conduct an independent state constitutional analysis when the issue has been
raised, even if merely to conclude that the two constitutions offer the same
protection. 191 Even in the two states following the interstitial approach,
whereby the state constitutions are construed only if the Federal Constitution
does not protect the right asserted,192 the choice to follow that model reflects
a preference by those courts to give their constitutions independent meaning
only intermittently.
To some extent, the small number of deviations from autonomous state
constitutionalism revealed by my search may reflect individual judges'
disinterest or distaste for state constitutionalism, rather than a shift in the
court's general jurisprudence. This would still be consistent with the theory
of intermittent state constitutionalism I have described, because it supports
the contention that more conservative judges might be more reluctant to
embrace state constitutionalism, or that certain judges might view some
issues as better resolved at the national level. Even a small number of
deviations in states like those studied here that have announced policies not
to deviate from strong independent constitutionalism, lead to
unpredictability for litigants and cast into doubt the idea that any state court
will give its constitution unflagging interpretive attention.
A. Oregon
Oregon has one of the strongest traditions and practices of independent
state constitutionalism in the United States, in large part due to the
extraordinary efforts of former Justice Hans Linde.193 The Oregon Supreme
Court has held that the state will follow the primacy approach, meaning that
it will always address a state constitutional issue before considering any
behave inconsistently.
191. See Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing Methodology and
Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1015, 1019 (1997) (arguing that so long as a state court conducts a genuine analysis of its
constitution, the result and order of proceeding cannot diminish the state's constitutional autonomy).
192. See infra notes 221-77 and accompanying text.
193. See Wayne V. McIntosh & Cynthia L. Cates, The Power of Judicial Ideas: A Tribute to
Justice Hans Linde, 64 ALB. L. REv. 1147, 1149 (2001) (explaining Justice Linde's enormous
influence on Oregon's approach to state constitutionalism).
Federal Constitutional issue where both are raised. 94 I looked at forty-eight
cases decided by the Oregon Supreme Court containing the phrases "state
constitution" or "Oregon Constitution" from the relevant time frame.' 95 Of
those, forty-four presented genuine state constitutional questions (the other
cases mentioned the state constitution as the source of the court's authority,
but did not confront a constitutional controversy). 96 In the great majority of
those cases, the Oregon Supreme Court performed a thorough and
sophisticated analysis of its state constitution, adhering to the primacy model
of adjudication. 97 In fact, primacy appears to have become so ingrained in
Oregon practice that in two cases, criminal defendants pressed only their
state constitutional claims, failing to raise the Federal Constitution well
enough to preserve the claim for review. 19' Despite Oregon's devotion to
strongly autonomous state constitutionalism and its clear precedent requiring
194. See, e.g., State v. Randant, 136 P.3d 1113, 1117 (Or. 2006) (following the proper sequence in
Oregon, which is to decide state constitutional questions before reaching federal questions).
195. Strunk v. Pub. Emples. Ret. Bd., 139 P.3d 956 (Or. 2006); Juarez v. Windsor Rock Prods.,
Inc., 341 Ore. 160 (2006); In re Conduct of Moultrie, 139 P.3d 955 (Or. 2006); State v. Randant, 136
P.3d 1113 (Or. 2006); Roberts v. SAIF Corp. (In re Roberts), 136 P.3d 1105 (Or. 2006); State v.
Makuch, 136 P.3d 35 (Or. 2006); State v. Crandall, 136 P.3d 30 (Or. 2006); Lincoln Loan Co. v.
City of Portland, 136 P.3d I (Or. 2006); State v. Roble-Baker, 136 P.3d 22 (Or. 2006); Martin v.
Myers, 135 P.3d 315 (Or. 2006); State v. Tiner, 135 P.3d 305 (Or. 2006); State v. Cook, 135 P.3d
260 (Or. 2006); State v. Bowen, 135 P.3d 272 (Or. 2006); Jury Serv. Res. Ctr. v. De Muniz, 134
P.3d 948 (Or. 2006); Gonzalez v. State, 134 P.3d 955 (Or. 2006); Engweiler v. Bd. of Parole, 133
P.3d 910 (Or. 2006); Mabon v. Wilson, 133 P.3d 899 (Or. 2006); State v. Johnson, 131 P.3d 173
(Or. 2006); Lombardo v. Warner, 132 P.3d 22 (Or. 2006); Kerr v. Bradbury, 131 P.3d 737 (Or.
2006); Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. v. Dep't of Trans., 132 P.3d 5 (Or. 2006); Perry v. Myers,
131 P.3d 734 (Or. 2006); Carley v. Myers, 132 P.3d 651 (Or. 2006); Pacificorp Power Mktg., Inc. v.
Dep't of Revenue, 131 P.3d 725 (Or. 2006); Perry v. Myers, 131 P.3d 721(Or. 2006); Allen v.
County of Jackson County, 129 P.3d 694 (Or. 2006); Macpherson v. Dep't of Admin. Servs., 130
P.3d 308 (Or. 2006); Hunnicutt v. Myers, 127 P.3d 1189 (Or. 2006); Miller v. Lampert, 125 P.3d
1260 (Or. 2006); State v. Upton, 125 P.3d 713 (Or. 2005); Springfield Util. Bd. v. Emerald People's
Util. Dist., 125 P.3d 740 (Or. 2005); State v. Sawatzky, 125 P.3d 722 (Or. 2005); State v. Heilman,
125 P.3d 728 (Or. 2005); Peiffer v. Hoyt, 125 P.3d 734 (Or. 2005); State v. Probst, 124 P.3d 1237
(Or. 2005); State v. Munro, 124 P.3d 1221 (Or. 2005); State v. Connally, 125 P.3d 1254 (Or. 2005);
Christ v. Myers, 123 P.3d 271 (Or. 2005); State v. Smith, 123 P.3d 261 (Or. 2005); State v. James,
123 P.3d 251 (Or. 2005); In re Lemery, 120 P.3d 1221 (Or. 2005); State v. Ciancanelli, 121 P.3d 613
(Or. 2005); City of Nyssa v. Dufloth, 121 P.3d 639 (Or. 2005); Lawson v. Hoke, 119 P.3d 210 (Or.
2005); State v. Harris, 118 P.3d 236 (Or. 2005); Rico-Villalobos v. Guisto, 118 P.3d 246 (Or. 2005);
Coast Range Conifers, LLC v. State, 117 P.3d 990 (Or. 2005); State v. Johnson, 116 P.3d 879 (Or.
2005).
196. Strunk v. Pub. Emples. Ret. Bd., 139 P.3d 956 (Or. 2006); Martin v. Myers, 135 P.3d 315
(Or. 2006); In re Conduct of Moultrie, 139 P.3d 955 (Or. 2006); In re Lemery, 120 P.3d 1221 (Or.
2005).
197. See, e.g., State v. Roble-Baker, 136 P.3d 22 (Or. 2006) (applying Oregon Constitution to a
self-incrimination claim).
198. See State v. Makuch, 136 P.3d 35, 42 (Or. 2006) (declining to reach any federal
constitutional claim because of the defendant's failure to adequately raise it); State v. Crandall, 136
P.3d 30, 31 n.1 (Or. 2006) (holding that the defendant did not effectively raise a constitutional
claim).
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the primacy approach, 99 there were still four decisions that deviated from
truly independent state analysis.
200
In State v. Johnson,2 0 1 a capital case, the court ruled that a search and
seizure satisfied generic "constitutional" standards, without specifying
which constitution it was considering.20 2 The court cited to both state and
federal precedents, further muddying the issue of which authority formed the
basis for its decision.20 3 Certainly, under the principles of Michigan v.
Long,2° Johnson does not provide a clear statement of the independent state
grounds for its search and seizure holding necessary to preclude U.S.
Supreme Court review. Notably, Johnson reached a "conservative" result:
the affirmance of a death sentence.2 °5  By applying a generic
constitutionalism ungrounded in any particular jurisdiction, the Johnson
court seems to have followed Professor Kahn's approach of using state
constitutional cases to comment on abstract constitutional values-the
constitution-in-the-air.
0 6
The court also left ambiguous which constitution it relied on to reach a
conservative result in a case involving a right-to-counsel issue raised on
collateral review.2 0 7 The criminal defendant (petitioner) argued that her right
to counsel had been abridged under both the state and Federal Constitutions
when her trial lawyer failed to make an argument that certain evidence
should have been suppressed. 2 8 Thus, the lawyer's performance hinged on
199. See Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d, 123, 126 (Or. 1981) (adopting primacy as Oregon state
constitutional law).
200. See infra notes 201-19 and accompanying text.
201. 131 P.3d 173 (Or. 2006). Justice Gillette has criticized his court's state constitutionalism
elsewhere, albeit while engaging in a sophisticated state constitutional analysis of his own. See
Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 849 P.2d 446, 477 (Or. 1993) (Gillette, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority for using the state constitution to reach its policy preference and arguing instead for a rule
consistent with Federal Supreme Court precedent), overruled by Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 11
P.3d 228, 243 (Or. 2000).
202. Johnson, 131 P.3dat 182.
203. Id. at 179, 189-90.
204. 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) ("[W]hen... a state court decision fairly appears . . . to be
interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law
ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation
that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to
do so."). Here, because the criminal defendant was denied the constitutional protection she sought
under both constitutions, Federal Supreme Court review would remain available even if the Oregon
court had expressed a clear distinction between the two constitutions.
205. Johnson, 131 P.3dat 194.
206. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
207. Peiffer v. Hoyt, 125 P.3d 734, 735 (Or. 2005) (discussing both federal and state right-to-
counsel standards).
208. Id. at 736.
the legitimacy of a police search and seizure.20 9 After a lengthy discussion
about preservation, the court decided that the trial counsel's performance
was constitutionally adequate because the search was within the scope of the
warrant, but made no indication about which constitution the court was
applying. 2'0  The court did not even acknowledge the possibility of a
difference between the Oregon right to counsel, or the right to privacy, and
the corresponding federal right.21'
Two other opinions from the 2005-2006 court year give more respect to
the state constitution, but still cannot qualify as consistent with a primacy
approach. In State v. Upton,2 12 the criminal defendant contended, among
other things, that statutory amendments to the state sentencing guidelines
constituted ex post facto punishment, in violation of both the state and
Federal Constitutions.2 3 The court noted that both ex post facto clauses
were similar, proceeded to conduct a single analysis for both claims without
distinguishing the applicability of different precedents to different
constitutions, and then concluded by holding that the statute did not violate
either clause.214  By conducting the analysis simultaneously and
interweaving the rationale, the court left unclear whether its interpretation of
the Oregon constitution depended on its view of federal law.215
In State v. Sawatzky,216 another sentencing enhancement case, the
criminal defendant raised an issue of double jeopardy under both the state
and Federal Constitutions.21 7 Although Sawatzky raised the state claim,
according to the court, she did not make an argument for why the state
constitutional protection should be interpreted differently from the federal
clause.21 8 Consequently, the court treated her argument as resting solely on
federal law.219 While this might sound like a perfectly reasonable approach,
it tracks the "interstitial" or "supplemental" model of state constitutionalism,
not primacy.
In each of these four cases, which together amount to almost ten percent
of the Oregon Supreme Court's total state constitutional decisions in the
2005-2006 court year, the primacy doctrine was abandoned and the court
declined to validate state constitutional rights claimed by criminal
209. See id.
210. Id. at 740.
211. See id.
212. 125 P.3d 713 (Or. 2005).
213. Id. at 719.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. 125 P.3d 722 (Or. 2005).
217. Id. at 724-25.
218. Id. at 725.
219. See id. at 725 n.6.
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defendants (on direct or collateral review). 220 These cases either mixed state
and federal constitutional law into a generic consitutionalism, or else gave
exclusive authority to federal law. While these four cases are not evidence
of a wholesale retreat from state constitutionalism in Oregon, which
otherwise exhibited a robust and complex state jurisprudence, they do
suggest that even a state that prides itself on the independence of its
constitutional law sometimes departs from theoretical purity. However,
given the attention the Oregon Court devoted to its other cases, and the
significance of the issues involved, these departures should not be viewed as
lapses or scrivener's errors, although state constitutionalism proponents
committed to the success of primacy might prefer to see these cases that
way. Giving the court the benefit of the doubt, it seems more than plausible
that the court simply chose to save itself some time and energy in reaching
the conclusion it had already deemed appropriate. These decisions, each of
which favored the police, illustrate a potential weariness among some
members of the court over the liberal ratchet tendency in state
constitutionalism.
B. Washington
The Washington Supreme Court decided forty cases in decisions
including the phrases "state constitution" or "Washington Constitution"
from August 1, 2005 to July 31, 2006.22 Thirty-two of these decisions
220. See State v. Johnson, 131 P.3d 173 (Or. 2006); Peiffer v. Hoyt, 125 P.3d 734 (Or. 2005);
State v. Upton, 125 P.3d 713 (Or. 2005); State v. Sawatzky, 125 P.3d 722 (Or. 2005).
221. State v. Brown, 117 P.3d 336 (Wash. 2005); State v. Kull, 118 P.3d 307 (Wash. 2005); State
v. Gurske, 118 P.3d 333 (Wash. 2005); Coppernoll v. Reed, 119 P.3d 318 (Wash. 2005); Tiffany
Family Trust Corp. v. City of Kent, 119 P.3d 325 (Wash. 2005); Brown v. State, 119 P.3d 341
(Wash. 2005); State v. O'Connor, 119 P.3d 806 (Wash. 2005); State v. Vincent, 120 P.3d 120
(Wash. 2005); State v. Louis, 120 P.3d 936 (Wash. 2005); HTK Mgmt. L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular
Monorail Auth., 121 P.3d 1166 (Wash. 2005); In re Recall of W., 121 P.3d 1190 (Wash. 2005);
State v. Brightman, 122 P.3d 150 (Wash. 2005); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (2005); State
v. Elmore 123 P.3d 72 (Wash. 2005); Sheehan v. Cent. Puget Sound Reg'l Transit Auth., 123 P.3d
88 (Wash. 2005); State v. Morse, 123 P.3d 832 (Wash. 2005); In re Recall of Reed, 124 P.3d 279
(Wash. 2005); Advanced Silicon Material L.L.C. v. Grant County, 124 P.3d 294 (Wash. 2005);
State v. Ose 124 P.3d 635 (Wash. 2005); Kershaw Sunnyside Ranches, Inc. v. Yakima Inturban
Lines Ass'n., 126 P.3d 16 (Wash. 2006); In re Recall of West, 126 P.3d 798 (Wash. 2006); State v.
Johnston, 127 P.3d 707 (Wash. 2006); Cent. Puget Sound Regional Transit Auth. v. Miller, 128 P.3d
588 (Wash. 2006); State ex rel Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 130
P.3d 352 (Wash. 2006); In re Coday 130 P.3d 809 (Wash. 2006); State v. Perala, 130 P.3d 852
(Wash. 2006); Trummel v. Mitchell, 131 P.3d 305 (Wash. 2006); Larson v. Seattle Popular Monorail
Auth., 131 P.3d 892 (Wash. 2006); State v. Linton, 132 P.3d 127 (Wash. 2006); State v. Jackman
132 P.3d 136 (Wash. 2006); State v. Levy, 132 P.3d 1076 (Wash. 2006); State v. Clarke, 134 P.3d
188 (Wash. 2006); State v. Luther, 134 P.3d 205 (Wash. 2006); State v. Borboa, 135 P.3d 469
(Wash. 2006); State v. Easterling, 137 P.3d 825 (Wash. 2006); State v. Zhao, 137 P.3d 835 (Wash.
involved questions of state constitutional interpretation.222 Similarly to
Oregon, state constitutionalism in Washington is often associated with one
leading former Justice, here, Robert Utter. Utter has been a vocal advocate
of state constitutionalism in both the law reviews 223 and the state reporter.224
Unlike Oregon, Washington does not purport to follow the primacy
approach, although it has made gestures in that direction. 5  Instead, its
leading decision of State v. Gunwal2 26 establishes "neutral" principles to
differentiate state constitutional protections from their federal parallels.227
Under this process, both constitutions should ordinarily be evaluated, but the
court will afford federal law a presumption of validity and only give an
independent analysis of the state constitution where "neutral" reasons are
offered for divergence.2 2 8  The Gunwall model has been described as
consistent with the "supplemental" or "interstitial" theory for this reason.229
An easy criticism of this approach is that it puts the state-federal relationship
at the center of constitutional interpretation, rather than leading the court
simply to eke out the best possible reading of the state constitution on its
own terms. 230  Nevertheless, even a decision that rejects a divergent
interpretation should still analyze the state constitution's text, history,
etcetera, if only to determine that it matches the federal parallel (assuming
there is one). 231  Instead, out of the thirty-two cases where a state
constitutional question was in dispute, nine Washington cases decided in the
time frame studied lack such an analysis. 2
32
2006); State v. Walker 138 P.3d 113 (Wash. 2006); State v. Leyda, 138 P.3d 610 (Wash. 2006);
Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006); T.S. v. Boy Scouts of America, 138 P.3d
1053 (Wash. 2006).
222. State ex rel Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 130 P.3d 352
(Wash. 2006); In re Recall of Carkeek, 128 P.3d 1231 (Wash. 2006); In re Recall of West, 121 P.3d
1190 (Wash. 2005); In re Coday 130 P.3d 809 (Wash. 2006); In re Recall of Reed, 124 P.3d 279
(Wash. 2005); Tiffany Family Trust Corp. v. City of Kent, 119 P.3d 325 (Wash. 2005); In re Recall
of Robinson, 132 P.3d 124 (2006); Trummel v. Mitchell, 131 P.3d 305 (Wash. 2006); In re
Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (2005).
223. See, e.g., Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on
Federal Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1025 (1985).
224. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. McCready, 868 P.2d 134, 137-38 (Wash. 1994) (evaluating the
warrant requirement under the state constitution as different and more protective than the federal
warrant requirement, and conducting an extensive analysis of the state constitution to reach the
disposition).
225. See State v. Coe, 679 P.2d 353, 359 (Wash. 1984) (following primacy approach and arguing
for why that theory is optimal).
226. 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986).
227. Id. at 811.
228. Id.
229. See TARR, supra note 52, at 183 n.36 (describing Gunwall as a "supplemental" case).
230. See id. at 183.
231. See Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 812-13.
232. State v. O'Connor, 119 P.3d 806 (Wash. 2005); State v. Louis, 120 P.3d 936 (Wash. 2005);
State v. Brightman, 122 P.3d 150 (Wash. 2005); State v. Ose, 124 P.3d 635 (Wash. 2005); State v.
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In several cases where a criminal defendant raised the issue of double
jeopardy, the Washington court declined to do any state constitutional
analysis because the court had already decided to follow the lockstep
approach in this area, meaning that the state double jeopardy provision
affords no greater protection to criminal defendants than the federal clause
does.2 33  While an interstitial state constitutionalism permits state courts to
follow federal precedent sometimes, permanently lopping off the double
jeopardy clause from the state constitution for all cases abandons the
important jurisprudential idea that the state constitution has a steady and
predictable meaning.234 Permanent lockstepping for particular issues, as
contrasted with treating state and federal protection as equivalent case-by-
case, leaves the sole interpretive authority for the state constitution in
Washington, D.C. instead of in Olympia, Washington. For example, the
Washington court applied the Gunwall neutral factors and reached its
conclusive decision that the two double jeopardy clauses had identical
meaning in 1995.235 Since then, the United States Supreme Court has
decided many cases interpreting the federal double jeopardy prohibition.236
Logically, there is no reason to infer that the state clause equated with the
federal clause in 1995 still bears the same congruence. Likewise, there is no
reason logically to infer that the changing double jeopardy landscape at the
Supreme Court 237 has any bearing on how Washington's constitutional text
has changed in the interim, or so the scholarly argument goes.
238
Johnston, 127 P.2d 707 (Wash. 2006); State v. Linton, 132 P.3d 127 (Wash. 2006); State v. Luther,
134 P.3d 205 (Wash. 2006); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006).
233. See, e.g., State v. Linton, 132 P.3d 127, 130 (Wash. 2006) (re-affirming that state and federal
double jeopardy clauses are interpreted in lockstep, and applying federal analysis to defendant's
claim); State v. Ose, 124 P.3d 635. 637 (Wash. 2005) (same); State v. Louis, 120 P.3d 936, 939
(Wash. 2005) (same).
234. Application of identical state and federal analysis to the protection against double jeopardy is
especially odd, considering that current double jeopardy doctrine rests on the "dual sovereignty"
notion. This concept permits states to try defendants who have already faced federal trials, on the
theory that the states are independent sources of legal power. See Erin M. Cranman, Comment, The
Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: A Champion of Justice or a Violation of a
Fundamental Right?, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1641, 1654 (2000) (describing the dual-sovereignty
exception to the rule against double jeopardy).
235. See State v. Gocken, 896 P.2d 1267, 1274 (Wash. 1995).
236. See, e.g., Smith v. Massachusetts, 542 U.S. 462 (2005); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193
(2004); Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634 (2003).
237. The U.S. Supreme Court itself has referred to its double jeopardy doctrine as confusing. See
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981) (describing double jeopardy jurisprudence as an
unnavigable "Sargasso Sea").
238. See Rachel A. Van Cleave, State Constitutional Interpretation and Methodology, 28 N.M. L.
REv. 199, 203-05 (1998) (describing the stifling effect of lockstep analysis on state constitutionalism
and legal development).
In a courtroom closure case, implicating both the defendant's right to a
public trial and the public's right to open courts, the Washington court also
followed federal precedents. 239  Here, however, the court left unclear
whether it was interpreting the state constitution as identical to the federal
constitution, as similar to that document, or even whether it was interpreting
the state constitution at all.240 The court did not apply any factors to identify
what degree of difference, if any, exists between the two constitutions, nor
did it make a clear statement of whether its holding rested on the state
constitution, the Federal Constitution, or both.24'
The court left similar ambiguity in three free speech cases.242 In two of
these cases, the defendant explicitly raised the state constitution as a basis
for protecting the conduct found criminal in each prosecution, but apparently
not well enough: the court acknowledged that the state constitution had been
raised, but also pointed out that the defendants failed to argue why the state
free speech clause should be construed more expansively than the Federal
First Amendment. 43 The result was that the court left open the question of
whether its holding determined the meaning of the state constitution or not.
In the third free speech case,244 the court did not explicitly blame the
litigants for failing to argue an independent interpretation of the state
constitution, but went on to conduct a mixed state/federal analysis that
treated the free speech clauses as if they were part of a generic
"constitutional" right.2 4 5 The court applied both federal and state precedents,
and never indicated whether its conclusion rested independently on state
grounds or whether it felt constrained by federal law. 46
In a right-to-confrontation case,247 the court acknowledged that the
defendant raised both state and federal constitutional claims and observed
that "[b]oth [constitutions] guarantee criminal defendants the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. 24 8 The court said nothing
239. See State v. Brightman, 122 P.3d 150, 154-61 (Wash. 2005) (holding that the state public
trial provisions "mirror" the Federal Constitution's and ordering a new trial for a defendant where
the trial court improperly closed the courtroom to the defendant and the public).
240. See id.
241. Id. at 152, 161.
242. See State v. Luther, 134 P.3d 205, 209-11 (Wash. 2006) (affirming a child pornography
conviction after conducting an undifferentiated analysis of state and federal constitutional law); State
v. Johnston, 127 P.3d 707, 709 (Wash. 2006) (conducting mixed analysis of state and federal law in
determining whether a drunken threat to bomb an airport was protected speech); Trummel v.
Mitchell, 131 P.3d 305, 312 (Wash. 2006) (affirming anti-harassment orders against a free-speech
challenge).
243. See Luther, 134 P.3d at 209-11; Johnston, 127 P.3d at 709.
244. Trummel, 131 P.3d at 312.
245. Id. at 311-15.
246. See id. at 305.
247. State v. O'Connor, 119 P.3d 806, 813 (Wash. 2005) (affirming a conviction against the
defendant's state and federal right-to-confrontation challenges).
248. Id.
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more to clarify which constitution it relied upon, and again conducted a
mixed analysis with reference to both state and federal precedents construing
the two different constitutions.24 9 Presumably, because the defendant lost,
the court concluded that neither constitution protected the right as claimed
by the defendant, but the court declined to segregate its analysis or review
any factors for why the state constitution might be more protective.250
Finally, in a highly publicized case concerning the right to marriage, the
court followed its precedents holding that the state "privileges and
immunities" clause receives lockstep interpretation with the federal equal
protection clause. 251  As a result, the court applied federal rational basis
review to the challenged legislation, even though the plaintiffs brought suit
strictly under the state constitution.252
C. New Jersey
New Jersey's 1947 constitution has been described as among the "best"
in the country, and the state supreme court has received wide accolades for
its relatively independent approach to state constitutionalism. 2 3 New Jersey,
however, has not adopted the primacy approach to its constitution favored
by scholars. Instead, the New Jersey Supreme Court, like Washington's, has
adopted the interstitial approach to state constitutionalism, at least
formally.25 4 According to its own precedent, the court will interpret its state
constitution differently from parallel clauses in the Federal Constitution only
249. Id. at 813-15.
250. Id.
251. See Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 968 (Wash. 2006) (following federal precedent
in lockstep).
252. See id. at 969.
253. See Robert F. Williams, Afterword: The New Jersey State Constitution Comes from Ridicule
to Respect, 29 RUTGERs L.J. 1037, 1044 (1998) (extolling the virtues of the New Jersey
constitution); see also Hershkoff, supra note 132, at 554 (describing the New Jersey court's strong
protection of social welfare rights); Kevin M. Mulcahy, Comment, Modeling the Garden: How New
Jersey Built the Most Progressive State Supreme Court and What California Can Learn, 40 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 863, 866-69 (2000) (urging California to become as constitutionally autonomous as
New Jersey); Marie L. Garibaldi, Conference on the Rehnquist Court: The Rehnquist Court and
State Constitutional Law, 34 TULSA L.J. 67, 74 (1998) (describing New Jersey as a strong supporter
of New Judicial Federalism). But see Karen L. Folster, High Court Studies, The New Jersey
Supreme Court in the 1990s: Independence is Only Skin Deep, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1501, 1540-41
(1999) (criticizing the New Jersey court for its sporadic implementation of independent state
constitutionalism despite its own rhetorical enthusiasm for the New Judicial Federalism).
254. See State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 957 (N.J. 1982) (adopting the interstitial approach);
Abrahamson, supra note 5, at 1172 ("New Jersey appears to use the interstitial method-at least
sometimes.").
if the issue presents certain "neutral" factors suggesting divergence. 55  In
the past, the court has inconsistently followed even this relaxed approach to
the state constitution.256 As the cases collected here show, that inconsistency
has continued through the most recent court year.
From August 1, 2005 to July 31, 2006, the New Jersey Supreme Court
decided twenty-two cases where interpretation of the state constitution was
in dispute.257 Of these, the court failed to follow its declared approach to
interpretation, the interstitial theory, in seven cases-nearly one third of its
state constitutional docket.25 8  An example of the ambiguity in these cases
appears in a major dispute over the right of property owners to have an
adversarial administrative hearing before a state agency grants development
permits. 259 The landowners raised both the state and federal constitutional
protections of due process, which the court acknowledged.26 ° Instead of
carefully applying the Hunt divergence factors to determine whether there
was any reason to treat the state claims differently from the Federal Due
Process analysis, the court conducted no independent review of the state
constitution at all. 26' Rather, it applied a mix of federal and state precedents
to conclude that the generic "constitutional" right to due process did not
255. See Hunt, 450 A.2d at 952 (in three writings, laying out three different theories of state
constitutionalism and applying an interstitial analysis). Professor Williams has called this case "the
single best decision on state constitutional law in our history," although it does not adopt his
preferred primacy approach. Robert F. Williams, The "New Judicial Federalism " and New Jersey
Constitutional Interpretation: Two Visions of State Constitutional Rights Protections, 7 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 833, 835 (1997).
256. See Dennis J. Braithwaite, An Analysis of the "Divergence Factors:" A Misguided Approach
to Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under the New Jersey Constitution, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 23
(2001) (cataloging areas of law where the New Jersey court has failed to follow its "divergence
factors" purportedly justifying deviation from the Federal Constitution on state law grounds).
257. R.M. v. Supreme Court, 883 A.2d 369 (N.J. 2005); State v. Badessa, 885 A.2d 430 (N.J.
2005); Tonelli v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Wychoff, 888 A.2d 433 (N.J. 2005); In re Freshwater
Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits, 888 A.2d 441 (N.J. 2006); State v. Eckel, 888 A.2d 1266 (N.J.
2006); State v. Dunlap 888 A.2d 1278 (N.J. 2006); State v. Birkenmeier, 888 A.2d 1283 (N.J. 2006);
Pasqua v. Council, 892 A.2d 663 (N.J. 2006); In re P.L. 2001 Chapter, 362, 895 A.2d 1128 (N.J.
2006); State v. Townsend, 897 A.2d 316 (N.J. 2006); In re Puglisi, 897 A,2d 1015 (N.J. 2006); Gac
v. Gac, 897 A.2d 1018 (N.J. 2006); Tax Auth., Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512 (N.J.
2006); Mansoldo v. State, 898 A.2d 1018 (N.J. 2006); State v. Thomas, 900 A.2d 797 (N.J. 2006);
State v. DiFrisco, 900 A.2d 820 (N.J. 2006); State v. Castagna, 901 A.2d 363 (N.J. 2006); State v.
Crawley, 901 A.2d 924 (N.J. 2006); State v. Herrera, 902 A.2d 117 (N.J. 2006); New Jersey Div. of
Youth & Family Servs v. S.S., 902 A.2d 215 (N.J. 2006); State v. Morrison, 902 A.2d 860 (N.J.
2006).
258. In re Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits, 888 A.2d 441 (N.J. 2006); State v.
Birkenmeier, 888 A.2d 1283 (N.J. 2006); State v. Townsend, 897 A.2d 316 (N.J. 2006); Mansoldo v.
State, 898 A.2d 1018 (N.J. 2006); State v. Thomas, 900 A.2d 797 (N.J. 2006); State v. DiFrisco,
900 A.2d 820 (N.J. 2006); State v. Castagna, 901 A.2d 363 (N.J. 2006).
259. See In re Freshwater Wetlands, 888 A.2d at 443.
260. See id, at 447.
261. Seeid.at454.
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protect the property owners, without specifying which source of law formed
the basis of the decision.
62
Similarly, in a criminal appeal involving the exclusionary rule and
illegally obtained evidence, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the
defendant's claims without ever distinguishing between the two
constitutions. 263 The court simply treated the vehicle stop as subject to an
unpredictable blend of constitutional law detached from any jurisdiction or
identifiable constitutional community.264
The court also departed from the interstitial approach in a murder
appeal, where the defendant challenged the prosecution's long pre-
indictment delay.265 Without any review of the "neutral" divergent factors,
the court extended a prior decision tying the state constitutional speedy trial
provision to the federal provision and declared that the state protection
against pre-indictment delays is interpreted in lockstep with the Federal
Constitution.266 The court affirmed the defendant's conviction.267
In the civil context, the New Jersey high court evaluated a takings claim
raised under both constitutions.268 The court noted the plaintiffs' invocation
of the state constitution, but explicitly limited the state constitutional takings
clause to a level of protection identical to the Federal Fifth Amendment.269
Thus, the court's lockstep analysis in this case would have been no different
if there were no takings clause at all in the state constitution.
The court conducted another indistinct "constitutional" analysis, mixing
the application of state and federal precedents with no mention of the Hunt
factors, in a criminal appeal raising the state and federal constitutional issue
of a defendant's right to have related or lesser offenses charged to the
jury.27 ° This ambiguous opinion left no way to determine whether an
independent state ground for the holding existed or not.
Even in an appeal from a sentence of death, the court treated the
defendant's state and federal constitutional claims of disproportionate
sentencing as indistinguishable.2 7 1  There, the court had conducted two
262. See id. at 450-54.
263. See State v. Birkenmeier, 888 A.2d 1283, 1285 (N.J. 2006) (holding a police investigatory
stop was legally justified, without distinguishing between state and federal analysis).
264. See id. at 1289-90.
265. State v. Townsend, 897 A.2d 316, 325 (N.J. 2006).
266. See id.
267. Id. at 326.
268. See Mansoldo v. State, 898 A.2d 1018, 1023 (N.J. 2006).
269. See id.
270. See State v. Thomas, 900 A.2d 797, 803 (N.J. 2006).
271. See State v. DiFrisco, 900 A.2d 820, 826-27 (N.J. 2006).
phases of review: direct appeal and a secondary proportionality analysis 2
Different justices voted differently in the two appeals, such that only by
considering the two votes together could the defendant prevail.273 The court
rejected the death sentence without clarifying which constitutional text
compelled its result.274
Most recently, in a right-to-confrontation clause case, the court again
acknowledged that the defendant raised claims under both constitutions, but
proceeded with a review that never made explicit which constitution
supported the holding. 275 Here, the court found generic constitutional error,
but determined the error was harmless and affirmed the defendant's
conviction.276 Intermingled state and federal precedents gave no indication
whether the state protection of defendants' right to confront the witnesses
against them is any greater than the Federal Constitution's, or if not, why.
2 77
D. New Hampshire
Along with Oregon, Washington, and New Jersey, New Hampshire has
shown an early and relatively steady interest in autonomous state
constitutionalism, 278 and the state supreme court is well-regarded around the
country.279 Like Oregon, it has held that it will follow the primacy approach,
giving independent meaning to its state constitution first and foremost.
280
Since its leading decision in State v. Ball,281 the New Hampshire high court
has customarily added boilerplate language to its constitutional decisions
specifying that it reaches the state constitution first and cites federal
precedent, if at all, merely for its persuasive power.282 Even the routine use
of this simple, clear statement showing an adequate and independent state
ground has not worked to produce perfect consistency in the court's
approach to state constitutionalism. Out of thirty-four cases the New
Hampshire court decided between August 1, 2005 and July 31, 2006 with a
272. See id.
273. See id. at 822-23.
274. Id. at 832-33.
275. See State v. Castagna, 901 A.2d 363, 372 (N.J. 2006).
276. See id. at 374.
277. Id. at 372-74.
278. See Friedman, supra note 156, at 107 (recognizing New Hampshire's leadership for
independent state constitutionalism).
279. See generally Seth Forrest Gilbertson, High Court Study: New Hampshire: "Live Free or
Die, " But in the Meantime..., 69 ALB. L. REV. 591 passim (2006) (describing the structure, make-
up, and jurisprudence of the state supreme court).
280. See State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (N.H. 1983) ("When a defendant, as in this case, has
invoked the protections of the New Hampshire Constitution, we will first address these claims.").
281. Id.
282. See, e.g., State v. Murray, 2006 N.H. LEXIS 92, at *6 (N.H. June 27, 2006) ("We consider
this argument under the State Constitution and cite federal opinions for guidance only."); see also
State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 352 (N.H. 1983).
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state constitutional question in controversy, at least two failed to provide an
independent state constitutional analysis. 283 Two more cases followed the
form of primacy, but nakedly applied (and followed) federal reasoning from
the United States Supreme Court with little inquiry into independent state
law.284
In a challenge to a juvenile delinquency adjudication,285 the New
Hampshire Supreme Court noted that the juvenile raised double jeopardy
claims under both the state and Federal Constitution.286 Nevertheless, the
court affirmed the delinquency judgment with a generic "constitutional"
analysis, relying almost entirely on Federal Supreme Court cases.2 87  The
court omitted any Ball boilerplate language suggesting that it relied on the
state constitution, leaving the state and federal analysis "interwoven" at
best. 88
Similarly, in a habeas petition presenting the issue of the prisoner's right
to counsel at a parole revocation hearing, the court noted that the case
presented both state and federal constitutional questions, but did not
distinguish its analysis between the two texts. 289 The court decided that the
claim lacked merit, but it did not specify which "due process" it was
283. In re State, 880 A.2d 397 (N.H. 2005); Winnisquam Reg'l Sch. Dist. v. Levin, 880 A.2d 369
(N.H. 2005); State v. Sanchez, 883 A.2d 292 (N.H. 2005); In re Berq, 886 A.2d 980 (N.H. 2005);
Pennichuck Corp. v. City of Nashua, 886 A.2d 1014 (N.H. 2005); State v. Gubitosi, 886 A.2d 1024
(N.H. 2005); Caparco v. Town of Danville, 886 A.2d 1045 (N.H. 2005); State v. Pierce, 887 A.2d
132 (N.H. 2005); State v. Barkus, 888 A.2d 398 (N.H. 2005); Associated Press v. State, 888 A.2d
1236 (N.H. 2005); In re Juvenile 2004-822, 888 A.2d 1258 (N.H. 2005) (court failed to provide an
independent state constitutional analysis); Dalton Hydro LLC v. Town of Dalton, 889 A.2d 24 (N.H.
2005); Bio Energy, LLC v. Town of Hopkinton, 891 A.2d 509 (N.H. 2005); State v. City of Dover,
891 A.2d 524 (N.H. 2006); In re R.A., 891 A.2d 564 (N.H. 2005); In re Jeffrey G., 892 A.2d 1234
(N.H. 2006); In re Petition of State, 893 A.2d 712 (N.H. 2006); State v. Homer, 893 A.2d 683 (N.H.
2006); State v. Arsenault, 897 A.2d 988 (N.H. 2006); State v. Burke, 897 A.2d 996 (N.H. 2006);
DeBenedetto v. CLD Consulting Eng'rs, Inc., 903 A.2d 969 (N.H. 2006); Debonis v. Warden, 903
A.2d 993 (N.H. 2006) (failing to provide an independent state constitutional analysis); State v.
Fichera, 903 A.2d 1030 (N.H. 2006); State v. Abram, 903 A.2d 1042 (N.H. 2006); In re Town of
Nottingham, 904 A.2d 582 (N.H. 2006).
284. State v. Gubitosi, 886 A.2d 1029, 1034 (N.H. 2005) (re-affirming a precedent denying a state
constitutional privacy interest in pen register data, primarily following federal precedent and
reaching the same result as the U.S. Supreme Court); State v. Homer, 893 A.2d 683, 688-89 (N.H.
2006) (following federal precedent exclusively to reach the same result as the federal courts despite
a Ball disclaimer that the federal precedents are merely persuasive).
285. In re Juvenile 2004-822, 888 A.2d 1258, 1259 (N.H. 2005).
286. See id. at 1259.
287. See id. at 1261-62.
288. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983). The Federal Supreme Court would have had
the power to review the judgment in any event, because the New Hampshire court denied the
defendant's claims, leaving his federal rights open for further review.
289. Debonis v. Warden, 903 A.2d 993, 995-97 (N.H. 2006).
applying.29 ° In this case, unlike the others described here, the court did cite
both state and federal precedents, but mixed them into an indistinct
291
"constitutional" reasoning.
IV. THEORY AND PRACTICE MUST RECONCILE
Taken together, the recent constitutional history of Oregon, Washington,
New Jersey, and New Hampshire shows that even states with the greatest
rhetorical commitment to consistently autonomous state constitutionalism
depart from their stated approach sometimes.2 92 When states with such
proven devotion to New Judicial Federalism occasionally reject its calling,
the academic efforts to promote a natural and routine state constitutionalism
appear quixotic. Some other, unspoken, cause for inconsistency must be at
work beyond the earnest logical appeals of the professors. Perhaps the state
courts' intermittent constitutionalism may be explained, in part, by the dual
legal identities of all Americans. Because all of us, including state court
judges, are members of both the state and national communities, we feel
competing pulls of affection toward the different poles. Even state officials,
who one might expect to most strongly identify with the legal community in
which they live their day-to-day lives, naturally privilege the federal strand
of their identities from time to time. In the judiciary, where the United
States Supreme Court receives disproportionate attention and respect, state
legal officials may feel that their own "legitimacy" depends on explaining
any result divergent from the Court's precedents. More deeply, state judges
are not "utility monsters" seeking endlessly to expand their own authority;
as Americans, they may genuinely prefer some issues to be decided
nationally, even if formal law permits a state-only resolution. By deciding
important controversies on the basis of national law, the state high court
makes two discrete choices: first, which source of law is appropriate to the
dispute, and second, what result that law should yield. A pure primacy
approach, while enthusiastically conceding that the state constitution can
produce any answer to the second question, by-passes the first choice.293
Conflict of laws scholars have expressed their annoyance at courts' failure to
follow coherent principles in conflict of law disputes.294 In both that context
and state constitutional cases, even an ambiguous decision is still an implicit
choice to follow one jurisdiction over the other.
290. See id.
291. See id.at 997.
292. See supra notes 193-291 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 45-46, 193-291 and accompanying text (for a discussion of the primacy
approach).
294. See Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining
Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1819, 1821 (2005) (chiding courts
where the judges "failed even to conceive of the issues raised in conflict terms").
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The distinction matters because each court decision subtly affects the
cultural development of the state community. This may appear as
repackaged Romantic Subnationalism, but I mean something quite different.
The doctrine that state communities express their character in state
constitutions, which can then be read like tarot cards by the state high courts,
is wrong logically and empirically, as Gardner and other scholars cited in
this Article have shown. Rather, I suggest that the opposite relation exists:
state constitutions and constitutional decisions help to create a sense of
cultural statehood, not express it.295
My position here is not at odds with Professor Schapiro's insight that
state constitutions can (and should) be interpreted as expressing an "ideal"
constitutional community, rather than the actual values of the people
happening to reside instate while a court's decision is pending.296 That
approach elegantly solves many of the problems raised by Professor
Gardner's attack on Romantic Subnationalism by dissociating constitutional
interpretation from the messy and changing reality of state communities.2 97
It also offers a coherent method of interpretation that lacks the legitimacy
problems associated with Romantic Subnationalism.2 98 Professor Schapiro,
unlike Professors Gardner or Kahn, does argue that a state's constitutional
norms should be autonomously developed, independently of concerns about
the state's place in the national legal system.299 Professor Gardner, in
contrast, asserts that states should use their constitutions merely as a site of
contestation, a springboard for debate over national values and national
law. 300 This Article addresses a different problem from Professors Gardner
and Schapiro: not how courts should interpret their constitutions, but how
state constitutional decisions should be interpreted by the rest of society.
Rather than make the data fit the theory, I seek to develop a theory to fit the
data; I wish to learn from the judges.
Law is "articulated" with culture, like a lever or joint, in the sense that
the legal system is a stabilizing institutional structure meant to impose order
on society, but is itself subject to destabilizing change from cultural
295. See Marie A. Failinger, Against Idols: The Court as a Symbol-Making or Rhetorical
Institution, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 367, 370-71 (2006) (distinguishing between "symbol-making" and
"rhetoric" as the difference between expressing existing values and urging values upon a community
that may not yet be convinced).
296. See Schapiro, supra note 5, at 390-93 (arguing for state constitutional interpretation
according to the values embedded in the document, not the court's perception of actual public
values).
297. Seeid. at 393.
298. See id.
299. See id. at 394.
300. See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 180.
forces.3 ' Law and popular culture tug on each other, but not linearly; rather,
the two are sometimes reinforcing, sometimes undermining, and sometimes
complementing each other.30 2 More simply, law is a "bird[] stilted on [its]
own legs;"303 it both rests on and recreates the underlying culture of the
people who imbue it with power.30 4  State high courts carrying out
constitutionalism are not free from this bonded interpretation common to all
law. Acts of legal interpretation are articulated with social structures,
regardless of the fame or esteem associated with the underlying legal
document, like M.C. Escher's famous picture of a hand drawing itself.
30 5
State constitutionalism is, concededly, a weak articulation of state
culture; there are much stronger and more numerous cultural influences
influencing a state population. Among these competing influences are the
factors Professor Gardner described as precluding the possibility of an
autonomous state constitutional culture: frequent migration, national media,
and internal diversity.30 6  While state culture may be too diffuse to justify
autonomous state constitutionalism, autonomous state decisions are
concentrated statism. The interaction is like a small oven in a big room: the
heat of the room will not appreciably raise the temperature in the oven, but
the oven (when turned on) can make the whole kitchen hot. Furthermore,
even a weak contribution to a sense of state cultural identity can have
unpredictably significant consequences.3 7  These consequences could
301. See Jennifer Daryl Slack, The Theory and Method of Articulation in Cultural Studies, in
STUART HALL: CRITICAL DIALOGUES IN CULTURAL STUDIES 112-113, 123-25 (David Morley &
Kuan-Hsing Chen, eds., 1996) (describing articulation theory in cultural studies and explaining how
seemingly unitary forces, like certain social institutions, depend in reality on shifting contexts and
power struggles); see also James Procter, STUART HALL 48 (2004) (explaining Hall's concept of
articulation as a "structured, but supple, relation between two or more apparently unconnected parts
(e.g. the economic and the ideological)").
302. See Slack, supra note 301; Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601,
1617-18 (1986) (describing the bonds between legal interpretation by a court and social organization
as "reciprocal" in that the judge must conduct interpretation so it will create actual (violent) effect
and simultaneously give meaning to that effect).
303. Seamus Heaney, The Peninsula, in NEW SELECTED POEMS: 1966-1987 11 (1990).
304. See James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and
Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 684, 691 (1985) (describing law as "always communal, both in
the sense that it always takes place in a social context and in the sense that it is always constitutive of
the community by which it works"). For a concrete example of law's absorption and reconfiguring
of social structure, see Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1707, 1718
(1993) (describing the passage into law of customs of racism and the subsequent reinforcement of
racist culture through recourse to law).
305. See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REv. 4, 8 (2003) (describing how
constitutional law is both produced by, and produces, culture); Naomi Mezey, Approaches to the
Cultural Study of Law: Law as Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 35-36 (2001) (describing law
and culture as influencing each other in an inseparable "complex entanglement").
306. See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 69-74.
307. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory
Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 763, 806 (2003) (describing legal structures
as "complex adaptive systems" that can have unpredictably large end-state changes after seemingly
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include a stronger sense of state identity among the people subject to the
new constitutional interpretation.
In this sense, it is especially important to avoid the binary conclusion
that there exists, or does not exist, a fixed state identity or community.
30 8
The identity of each individual is perpetually shifting, as time, context, and
experience vary, and consequently so shifts the cultural community to which
the individuals belong.30 9 A rugby team has a fairly strong identity, but once
off the field, the athletes may conceive of other communities (like their
church, or family, or the Marine Corps) as holding much stronger claims to
their identities. There can be no "true" or "false," then, to the declaration
that a state community exists. Individuals feel like part of a state community
when they engage in values discourse centered on, and limited to, the state.
The participants in this discourse may change as people move into or out of
the state, and thus, into or out of the discussion. Still, legal behavior can
affect the likelihood of any given individual within the state feeling a sense
of state identity. In this way, state identity is a bit like a subatomic electron
cloud: an individual electron is only approximately in any one place, but
when pushed by energy, it will move in a more or less predictable way to
another approximate location. State constitutionalism tends to push
individuals toward feeling like part of a state community, at least some of
the time, at least for some issues of public importance.
By giving a specifically state-based interpretation to a legal controversy,
the court asserts the state as the proper community to resolve the dispute.
Who decides the question is what matters for forming a sense of state
community, not what the answer is.3 I Whether the court ends up with a
result equivalent to federal law or a more expansive interpretation, by
treating the dispute as one of state law, the court expresses a conviction that
the matter should be decided internally, according to the state's own
methods and traditions.3 ' Fundamentally, the court is putting the state
minor alterations in starting conditions); Adam Liptak, Case Won on Appeal (To Public), N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2006, at wk-3 (describing the capacity of courts to elevate issues for public debate
and the resulting surge in popular political awareness and activism).
308. See Solimine & Walker, supra note 29, at 1468 ("Whatever may have been true in the past,
in this century it is unrealistic to contend that each state has a distinctive political or social culture,
especially one that differs in important ways from national culture.").
309. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Between Selves and Collectivities: Toward a Jurisprudence of Identity,
61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1213, 1219 (1994) (describing individual identity, the "self," as an aggregation of
multiple socially-constructed roles).
310. See Sally Engle Merry, Law, Culture, and Cultural Appropriation, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
575, 582 (1998) (describing culture as a site of contestation, where multiple forms of identity come
into contact in supporting and opposing ways).
311. See Republican Party of Texas v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. 1997) (upholding a state action
requirement under the state constitution comparable to the federal requirement, but conducting a
forward as a coherent and potent legal community-not a constitutionally
significant authoring community, but an interpretive community.3"2
More than setting the state as the appropriate forum, the court declares,
though the value-laden label "constitutional" applies, that the question is
relevant to the state's identity.31 3  Courts have multiple avenues open to
avoid reaching a state constitutional question, not least of which is resort to
the Federal Constitution, but also including a generic constitution-in-the-
314air, statutory interpretation, common law, and even a court's "inherent" or
supervisory powers.3 15 When a court does reach the state constitution, the
conventional understanding of the word "constitutional" itself suggests to
the state public that the matter is one of fundamental importance.316 For
example, many of the cases decided by the four state supreme courts
reviewed in this Article that did reflect independent state constitutional
analysis were tax cases.317 By giving these cases a truly autonomous
interpretation, the courts were not expressing the "character" of the state
polity nor its fundamental norms, but the courts were teaching the parties,
the bar, and the public that cases of that type are part of what bind the people
of the state together.
Notably, the particular resolution in any given case is not what does the
culture-building work. In contrast to the bureaucratic model, law and its
implementing structures are not policy machines, with inputs, a cost-benefit
analysis, and then an efficient or inefficient output.318 Rather, law is fluid,
highly situated, and culture-forming.1 9 In this sense, setting the question
itself as one of importance to the state serves as a prod toward a stronger
state identity. How one frames an issue can often be culturally more
important than how the question is answered.32 ° In the context of state
comprehensive autonomous state analysis in doing so).
312. See Schapiro, supra note 5, at 393 (suggesting that rather than "reflect a preexisting
community of value, each state constitution "creates its own community" based on the norms
embodied in the text).
313. See infra note 316 and accompanying text.
314. Cf Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) ("Proof of negligence in the
air, so to speak, will not do.") (citation omitted).
315. See Roger A. Silver, The Inherent Power of the Florida Courts, 39 U. MIAMI L. REv. 257,
258 (1985) (describing state courts use of their inherent or supervisory powers).
316. GARDNER, supra note 2, at 13 (acknowledging that the conventional view of constitutions is
that they necessarily express the deep values underlying the authoring community).
317. See, e.g., Larson v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 131 P.3d 892, 893 (Wash. 2006)
(holding that the monorail authority had been properly delegated taxing authority under the state
constitution).
318. See White, supra note 304, at 686 (describing and rejecting the bureaucratic/economic view
of law divorced from its linguistic and cultural context).
319. See id. at 684 (describing law as a form of rhetoric rather than a system of rules or policy-
effectuating techniques).
320. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986) (framing the issue as whether the
Constitution contained a right to perform homosexual sodomy), with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 564-65 (2003) (framing the same issue as whether the Constitution contains a right to privacy in
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constitutionalism, a decision founded independently on the state constitution
reveals to the state polity that Washington, D.C. does not exercise plenary
power over every matter of public importance. Lawyers learn that the issue
is one to pursue through state courts, according to state precedents while the
public learns that state politics is the appropriate locus of meaningful
response. Gradually, a series of autonomous state constitutional decisions
create a community of people (even if some of its members are transitory)
that turns to itself to solve certain social dilemmas.32' The continued
practice of this shared experience and shared activism necessarily instills the
feeling, among participants, of belonging to a unique, bounded, and integral
polity.
322
This view of state constitutionalism inspires the question of how the
norms of state identity expressed in state court decisions are transmitted to
the state's people. Lawyers are the primary interpretive community for
court decisions, and they, in turn, influence the public's perception of
judicial practice.323  As Clark Cunningham explains, lawyers act as
translators: they convert real-world stories into legal language/reasoning and
then retranslate the legal conclusions into language comprehensible to their
clients and the public.324 James Boyd White emphasizes the completeness of
the alternate language known as law, going so far as to credit legal language
with "giv[ing] us the terms for constructing a social universe. 325
The special role of lawyers in bridging real-world controversies and
legal discourse is more pronounced in state constitutionalism. As Professor
Gardner described state communities, the high mobility of workers served to
elide or erase the autonomous features of state cultures.326 Lawyers, on the
other hand, are more likely to be geographically fixed than workers with
the bedroom).
321. See White, supra note 304, at 698 ("It is the true nature of law to constitute a 'we' and to
establish a conversation by which that 'we' can determine what our 'wants' are and should be.").
322. See Schapiro, supra note 5, at 393 (describing autonomous state culture as the product, not
the ingredient, of state constitutional interpretation and linking state constitutions not to actual state
polities but to "the aspirational community constituted by the principles set forth in the
constitution").
323. See W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 393 (2004) (describing
lawyers as a "particular interpretive community" that serves to reconcile the interests of individuals
with those of the broader community).
324. See Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an
Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298, 1299-1300 (1992) (describing the
lawyer's power to alter a client's story through re-presentation into legal forms and the
corresponding challenge of crafting a sensible narrative out of legal actions).
325. White, supra note 304, at 692.
326. See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 70 (describing Americans' migratory patterns and mobility as
fixed patterns of contemporary life that undermine claims of unique state cultures).
portable skills because of the bar licensing requirements. Furthermore, the
geography to which lawyers are attached exactly match state jurisdictions,3 27
and because states make it an ethical violation to practice law without a
license from the state (or without special permission), lawyers must limit
their work to the states in which they hold bar membership.328 Legal culture,
then, is not subject to the migratory pressures our national culture imposes
on the broader state community. As a consequence, legal culture is
distinctive from state to state.
Voluntary associations, like local bar associations or law-related
charities, are also near-universally divided by jurisdiction, i.e., along state
lines. National and local associations also attract lawyers' attention, but
these multiple pulls on communal identity recapitulate the multiple claims
on identity that intermittent state constitutionalism exerts on the public.
Despite the other levels of voluntary association, state bar groups serve to
further bond a state's lawyers into a cohesive state-based community. One
sees this, for a (trivial) example, in lawyers' notorious use of jargon that
confirm insider status for the in-state lawyer and exclude laypersons and
those unfamiliar with local legal practice.329  More substantively,
idiosyncracies in formal state legal structures that may go unnoticed by the
general public become daily routine for practicing lawyers, and this too
serves to make states the center of legal culture. For example, Connecticut
lawyers know that the state attorney general has no powers of criminal law
enforcement, 330 Texas lawyers know that civil and criminal cases are
governed by two different high courts, 33' and New York lawyers know that
civil cases can sometimes get three layers of state appellate review, while
criminal cases will never get more than two.
3 32
327. The vast majority of lawyers who work for firms work in only one state. See Am. Bar
Found., 16 RESEARCHING LAW 1, 11 (2005), available at http://www.abfn.org/images/reslawwin05.
pdf (reporting that in 2000, 88% of law firms had only one office and that among those moderate-
sized firms that maintained more than one office, most kept all of their offices within one state).
328. See Diane Leigh Babb, Comment, Take Caution When Representing Clients Across State
Lines: The Services Provided May Constitute the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 50 ALA. L. REV.
535, 535-37 (1999) (describing the regulatory practices restricting interstate law practice).
329. Some New York lawyers (and even courts) will un-selfconsciously refer to the state trial
court as the "IAS court"-an arcane and bureaucratic reference to the "individual assignment
system" whereby the state trial judges are assigned their dockets. See, e.g., Emily Hunger Plotkin,
Comment, Arts Education: A Fundamental Element of Public School Education, 26 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 75, 85 (2002). The phrase adds no useful information to any legal discussion, but does
succeed in establishing those who catch the reference as insiders while marking the
uncomprehending as outside the state legal community.
330. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 3-125 (2006) (excepting from the powers of the Attorney General any
issue over which state prosecutors have authority).
33 1. See Andrew T. Solomon, A Simple Prescription for Texas's Ailing Court System: Stronger
Stare Decisis, 37 ST. MARY'S L.J. 417,433 (2006) (describing the structure of Texas courts).
332. See Court Structure, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/structure.shtml (last visited Oct. 7,
2006) (graphically displaying the structure of New York state courts).
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Additionally, informal practices, such as the habits of local judges, the
customs of oral argument, and the efficiency of court clerks, all serve to
reward insiders and hinder lawyers from outside jurisdictions. Indeed,
recognition of the peculiarities of practice from state to state justifies the
ethical rules requiring out-of-state counsel to hire local counsel for
litigation.3 33 Even the signs and symbols of legal practice are heavily
imbued with the concept of the state as a community of meaning: state flags
appear in every courtroom and legislative chamber; state seals mark
doorways, uniforms, and letterhead; and the architecture of state courthouses
and office buildings form the visual environment of the lawyer.
In a sense, lawyers are not only translators of legal language, but they
also translate state identity to and from the rest of a state's citizens, using
that language. The bar can be thought of as a mediating institution: a social
structure designed to stand between, and connect, a diffuse group with weak
cultural links and a stronger cultural community. Through the process of
translating legalese into common parlance, lawyers teach their clients
traditional legal norms like due process, equal protection, and separation of
powers, but the same conversations convey a second order of value: the
notion of a particular community in which those norms are debated. When
state constitutional decisions resolve a public conflict, the court establishes
the state as that relevant community, and lawyers duly extend the lesson to
the broader public. Lawyers are culture workers, building a sense of state
identity within the hearts of the transient, distracted, and nationalist state
citizens.
Because lawyers do stand between state constitutional decisions and
their influence on public culture, the power of these decisions is diminished
as it is transmitted, like the gradual loss of electrical current along a poorly
insulated wire. To be effective at building a state identity, however, state
constitutionalism need not hit the public at full blast. Just as state courts
interpret their constitutions only intermittently, so a feeling of belonging to a
state community will only arise in the hearts of the public intermittently.
This modest sense of state identity is enough to achieve the important
normative goals described in Part V.
The public also gets word of state constitutionalism through the popular
media, when the issue is controversial enough to reach the headlines. The
same-sex marriage cases around the country334 probably constitute the most
333. Clint Eubanks, Student Commentary: Can I Conduct This Case in Another State? A Survey of
State Pro Hac Vice Admission, 28 J. LEGAL PROF. 145, 147 (2003) (describing the common
requirement that out-of-state attorneys share representation with a local attorney).
334. See, e.g., Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 968 (Wash. 2006) (upholding the
constitutionality of a state ban on same-sex marriage).
widely-known exercise of state constitutional authority in recent times.
Whichever result the state courts reach on this issue, by framing the question
as one of state constitutional law, the courts establish states as the right
forum for regulating marriage. In particular, the people of each state are
shown that they, together as a community, constitute the participants in the
conversation. Their voices, not those of the national culture, count. Because
communities are merely a network of relationships, who does the debating
matters more than the content of the debate. The success of prominent state
constitutionalism issues giving rise to a sense of state identity in people is
apparent from the failure of federal officials to dominate the issue, despite
vigorous attempts, including the "Defense of Marriage Act" signed by
President Clinton. 335 For a different illustration of the significance of state
constitutional decisions in crafting a state cultural identity, consider the
"public use" provision of the Takings Clause. 336 The recent, and much-
publicized, Kelo v. City of New London case337 provides an example of a
failed state constitutional moment, when national authorities were able to
remove the cultural heft of an issue from the states by virtue of the state
court's lockstep approach to the state constitution.338
The public's reaction to state constitutional decisions is one gauge of
how these decisions tend to build and reinforce a sense of belonging in the
state community. Letters to the editor and calls to radio shows show the
high passion associated with state constitutional issues like environmental
conservation, direct democracy provisions, and single-subject ballot
procedures, apart from the nationally famous issues of same-sex marriage
and takings. 339  These "small-time" cases establish a literal conversation
about the state, its people, and its values. Of course, more formal and
binding avenues for citizen comment on state constitutionalism also reveal
335. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996); 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996) (refusing to recognize same-sex marriages
for federal purposes and purportedly authorizing states to refuse recognition to such marriages
conducted in sister states). While the federal government has not succeeded in dominating this issue,
I concede that national private groups have been disproportionately influential within the states on
this topic.
336. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
337. 843 A.2d 500, 521 (Conn. 2004), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
338. But cf City of Norwood v. Homey, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1141 (Ohio 2006) (adopting the Kelo
dissenters' position as a matter of Ohio state constitutional law). In addition to an example of a state
supreme court using its own constitution to challenge the result reached by the U.S. Supreme Court
on an identical issue, this case is also an example of independent state constitutionalism yielding a
more economically conservative result than lockstep analysis would have.
339. See, e.g., Mark Hautzinger, Letter to the Editor, Don't Take It Lightly, LINCOLN JOURNAL
STAR (Neb.), July 5, 2006, at B5 (arguing that the direct democracy provisions of the state
constitution are important); Allen Peacock, Letter to the Editor, Right Wing Misperceptions,
DENVER POST, June 19, 2006, at B-07 (supporting the state supreme court's invalidation of a ballot
measure for having more than one subject as an example of strict construction of the state
constitution); Linda Henderson Gordon, Letter to the Editor, Pollution Affects All, DAILY PRESS
(Newport News, Va.), June 17, 2006, at A12 (arguing that a proposed wastewater release permit
would violate the state constitution's protection of public oyster beds).
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the importance of state identity in providing the perspective through which
state residents approach the problems of public life. Among these formal
outlets are judicial recall elections, 340 state constitutional amendment, 34' and
the practice of ordinary politics to elect new justices (or new justice-
appointing politicians). The common thread among these different forms of
reaction to state constitutional decisions is that they depend on the existence
of a state community in which to conduct the debate.342 The rhetoric of
these expressions centers on contested meanings of the state identity and its
fundamental norms.
Some of the issues subject to state constitutional analysis, like the tax
cases discussed earlier,343 education rights344 or municipal law,3 45 might be
perceived as inherently local issues, without the possibility of a meaningful
debate at the national level. While these issues are unlikely to generate
widespread coverage in the national media, they may generate more
discussion within the states because schools, taxes, and the authority of local
governments to regulate neighborhoods have obvious impact on the daily
lives of most Americans. Other state constitutional decisions do present
questions being debated across the country, questions that could potentially
be subject to a uniform national response: these include same-sex
marriage, school vouchers,347 and free speech cases, among others. In
either case, a strongly independent state constitutional analysis stakes out the
340. See John T. Wold & John H. Colver, The Defeat of the California Justices: The Campaign,
the Electorate, and the Issue ofJudicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348, 349 (1987) (describing
the defeat of three state supreme court justices in judicial retention elections).
341. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67, 73-74 (Haw. 1993) (applying, on state
constitutional grounds, strict scrutiny to the legislative ban on same-sex marriage), superseded by
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1998) (granting the legislature the power to ban same-sex marriage).
342. Both formal and informal popular reaction to state constitutional issues puts the residents of
the state in a relationship with each other where they must convince each other of the preferred
solution in order for it to prevail. This give-and-take, i.e., politics, is what makes the state
community a relevant social and legal entity.
343. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
344. See, e.g., Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1280-81 (Conn. 1996) (deriving from the state
constitution an obligation on the state to integrate the public schools).
345. See, e.g., In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 628 A.2d 537, 539-40
(R.I. 1993) (advising that the state constitution prohibits the legislature from removing a class of
local elected officials by reorganizing local districts).
346. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (protecting
the right to same-sex marriage under the state constitution).
347. See, e.g., Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d 933, 942-44 (Colo.
2004) (striking the state's school voucher program as a state constitutional violation of local school
board control over education).
348. See, e.g., N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757,
761-62 (N.J. 1994) (holding that no state action requirement applies to the state constitutional free
speech protections).
area as a matter for the state community.3 49 The ensuing process of neighbor
talking to neighbor about the issue as a state matter helps build moments of
state character among the individual participants in the debate.350 This
activism builds in the state a habit of state-centered problem solving, and a
view that political or legal success will depend on appealing to the other
members of the state community.351
V. INTERMITTENT STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM IS INEVITABLE AND
ENOUGH
So far, I have shown that even states with a keen devotion to
autonomous state constitutionalism actually engage in that practice
intermittently.3 2 I have also argued that when states do confront their state
constitutions and perform a genuinely independent analysis, the result
fosters a sense of state identity among the people of the state.353 Now, I
argue that this intermittent state constitutionalism is unavoidable in our
federal system. I further seek to show that this sense of state belonging may
not be a dominant chord in an individual's cultural identity, but neither is it
too minimal to matter; in fact, intermittent state constitutionalism is good for
Americans.
Even if every case raising a state constitutional question were fully
briefed from extensive state sources, and the constitutional record and text
offered universes of rich interpretive possibility, judges would still bypass
autonomous state constitutionalism in certain cases because state judges, like
anyone else, are subject to the philosophical claims of multiple
communities.354  A nationalist, or "patriotic," facet of identity will
sometimes overwhelm the state judges' philosophical loyalty to their
states.355 Further, state judges can fall subject to the ideology embodied by
American Exceptionalism that places this nation as the paradigm of justice
and law.356 Cases revealing lockstep constitutional analysis are examples of
state judges' privileging of national law as the best and most fitting for the
issue at hand.35 7 This cultural perspective, which is constantly reinforced in
349. See supra notes 310-12, 334-35 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 310-20 and accompanying text
351. See supra notes 310-12, 334-35 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 188-291 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 301-22 and accompanying text.
354. See Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction of
Professional Identity, 14 CARDOzo L. REv. 1577, 1578 (1993) (discussing the multiple social and
ethical communities that make claims on an individual's identity).
355. Cf. Pettys, supra note 171, at 1359 (discussing the cultural power of "patriotism" to distract
the public and officials from alternative institutional arrangements that might serve as "competitive
forces" to protect the people from federal overreaching).
356. See supra notes 163-70 and accompanying text.
357. See, e.g., Mefford v. White, 770 N.E.2d 1251, 1260 (Il1. App. Ct. 2002) ("Illinois court
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popular and political discourse, provides a powerful counterbalance to the
call of autonomous state constitutionalism. While they are professionally
inclined toward the state, all state judges are also participants in the national
social and legal cultures.
Even the state courts' Federal Constitutional obligation to hear federal
questions may tend to emphasize to state judges their responsibility for
national law.358 Consequently, they may believe that some issues are best
resolved at the national level. When a state claim about such an issue comes
before the state court, the judges will seek to resolve it as if it were a federal
question. Doing so conveys the opposite message from that described above
with regard to the community-building aspect of state constitutionalist
decisions.359 A decision founded on federal precedent and reviewable by the
United States Supreme Court stands as a declaration by the authoring state
court that the issue is one of national scope and should be decided by the
national community.
State judges are also subject to institutional pressures related to those
described in the anti-commandeering jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.360
While the anti-commandeering cases reflect a federal concern that state
officials be held accountable only for decisions fairly within their control,
3 61
state officials may sometimes wish to evade such accountability. By
deciding cases on the basis of federal law (and therefore consistently with
the federal floor), state courts pass responsibility for the result onto at least
one different institution-the United States Supreme Court.362 If the state
courts also affirm a legislative act by turning away from the state
constitution, they direct the disappointed litigant's (and the sympathetic
public's) attention to the legislative branch.363 These structural pressures
typically apply the 'lockstep' doctrine, which dictates that provisions of the Illinois Constituion
should be construed in the same manner as similar provisions of the United States Constitution.").
358. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (binding state judges to follow federal law); Howlett v. Rose, 496
U.S. 356, 367-70 (1990) (holding that state courts have a constitutional duty to hear and resolve
federal questions over which the states have concurrent jurisdiction).
359. See supra notes 310-12, 334-45 and accompanying text.
360. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992) (describing the problems of
political accountability associated with federal commandeering of state officials).
361. See Ann Althouse, Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court
Dialogue, 42 DUKE L.J. 979, 988-89 (1993) (describing the democratic accountability concerns
behind U.S. Supreme Court federalism decisions, and noting that when state courts do not specify
which source of law they rely upon, they might avoid political responsibility for their decision).
362. See, e.g., State v. Marsh, 102 P.3d 445, 458 (Kan. 2004), rev'd, Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct.
2516 (2006) (applying solely federal constitutional criminal procedure to vacate a death sentence,
although the claim was also raised under the state constitution).
363. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 1836, at *1, *9-10 (N.Y. Ct. App. July 6,
2006) (relying primarily on federal precedent and deference to the legislature to leave intact a state
will exist for as long as federalism and separation of powers remain our
political framework. Once in a while, state courts will succumb and pass the
political responsibility for their decisions to the other institutions of
government. Still, when the state courts do accept the yoke of interpreting
their constitutions, they effectively advance a unique state culture and
identity by teaching the public to look to state law to resolve local
controversies.
The cases from the past court year examined in Part III show some signs
of the tendency toward nationalism described here.3 '64 For example, three of
the four Oregon cases examined in the text above dealt in part with the
exclusionary rule,365 a legal principle currently subject to sharp debate at the
federal level. 366 By treating the issue as a matter of national law, the state
court implicitly adopted the view that a single, national rule should apply
and that law enforcement officials should not have to conduct themselves
according to different exclusionary rules in state and federal court.367 More
explicitly, the Washington double jeopardy cases collected above plainly
state that the state constitutional protection has no meaning beyond the
Federal Constitution's prohibition of double jeopardy-a clear indication
that the court believes questions of double jeopardy should be decided at the
national level.3 6' The New Jersey administrative due process and takings
cases are interesting for blending state and federal constitutional law,
without suggesting which source of law dictated the result.369 This suggests,
perhaps, the state court's reluctance to accept institutional responsibility for
its results. While the decisions never come out and say the court is obliged
to follow federal law, they smooth over the issue enough to leave the losing
parties unsure who to blame. The two New Hampshire cases also blend
state and federal law into a "constitutional" haze, leaving accountability for
the results at least potentially outside the state courthouse.3 70
Given state judges' nationalist feelings founded in American
Exceptionalism, their view that some issues are best decided at the federal
level, and the institutional pressures to transfer accountability away,
intermittent state constitutionalism is the best the academic advocates can
expect. Nevertheless, state constitutionalism need not be perfectly
consistent to be effective at raising state consciousness and fostering state
ban on same-sex marriage).
364. Seesupra notes 188-291.
365. State v. Johnson, 131 P.3d 173 (Or. 2006); Peiffer v. Hoyt, 125 P.3d 734, 735 (Or. 2005);
State v. Sawatzky, 125 P.3d 722 (Or. 2005).
366. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165 (2006) (declining to apply the
exclusionary rule to "knock-and-announce" violations of the Fourth Amendment).
367. See supra notes 201-18 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 259, 268 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 284-89 and accompanying text.
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culture for those issues that the courts do decide on the basis of state law.
State constitutionalism builds state identity case-by-case, issue-by-issue. A
state court's decision to forego applying the state constitution no more
undermines the development of a vibrant state culture than would a federal
court decision on the same question.371
VI. BUILDING STATE COMMUNITIES IS A GOOD IDEA
Romantic Subnationalism, the theory by which state courts interpret
their constitutions according to their perception of a unique state culture, has
been discredited.372 The possibility of using state constitutions to heighten a
feeling of belonging for residents in a state community, however, remains
viable. Assuming that state courts can encourage state residents to think of
themselves as belonging to a state polity, and that such encouragement is
effective even if intermittent, one question remains: is strengthening state
identity desirable? In this Part, I propose that the answer is an emphatic yes.
A comprehensive inquiry into each potential justification is beyond the
scope of this Article. Nevertheless, the rationales for strong state
communities offered here suffice to show that intermittent state
constitutionalism is normatively worthwhile.373
There are risks attached to the development of states as cultural groups.
The vicious "states' rights" proponents of Jim Crow segregation used their
state identities to divide and exclude, in ways far worse than even the less
attractive aspects of American Exceptionalism. 374  The intermittent state
constitutionalism described here, however, minimizes the risk of such
virulent statism; in this respect, its inconsistency is its saving virtue.
Intermittent state constitutionalism will indeed foster a sense of state
identity, but because the state courts will never treat all fundamental social
questions as resolvable under state constitutions, the state identity occasional
decisions develop will be relatively weak. This fleeting, issue-based sense
of state community seems unlikely to grow into the malign, "us versus
them" attitude of the Jim Crow years.
371. Indeed, piecemeal state constitutionalism is effective in part for the very reason it is needed:
the public largely ignores state constitutions and state issues, so that if the state court does too, the
public will not take the omission as anything beyond an assertion that the issue is federal. That view
matches public assumptions, and offers the comfort of confirming a pre-conceived notion.
372. See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 21.
373. See supra notes 334-43 and accompanying text.
374. See Linda Greene, Jim Crowism in the Twenty-First Century, 27 CAP. U. L. REv. 43, 46
(1998) (explaining Jim Crow laws and how they focused on explicit racial classification as a means
of separating the white experience from that of blacks, including excluding blacks from jury
service).
Fostering the dual strands of state and national identity in Americans
gives popular expression to the checks and balances of federalism as laid out
in the "plan of the Convention., 37 5  The Constitution lends itself to
permitting the people to trust one government or another with authority,
treating the state and the federal governments as perpetual competitors
seeking to please the true sovereign, the people.376 That the practice appears
consistent with historical expectations, however, would not be enough to
justify strong state identities if other reasons were lacking. The key to
justifying loyalty to states and unique state cultures lies in the value of
pluralism.
When state cultures diverge from one another, even ephemerally, the
problems of daily living become matters for resolution by the state
community. This pulls political power toward more local authorities
accessible to the people, where the average person's influence on politics
and law is stronger.177  The daunting task of repairing a broken federal
policy may overwhelm even the most earnest citizens, while affecting state
government is likely to appear more feasible.
As state cultures become distinct, at least about certain issues, the
articulation between law and culture may take effect, leading to distinct
structural institutions across state lines. Already, to some extent, state
governmental structures vary, as described in Part V. Willingness to depart
from the "normal" federal mold permits state polities to better suit their
governments to their needs.3 78  An autonomous state culture, bolstered by
state constitutionalism, gives a state's citizens the strength to develop new,
more radical structures to help achieve their social goals.379
Developing varied state cultures also fosters learning through other
states, not in the rigid, laboratories-of-democracy way, but just as foreign
travel broadens the mind. Divergence among states, coupled with the high
mobility of Americans, would lead to a refreshingly routine self-examination
by state governments. This is not to suggest that a state would adopt another
state's exclusionary rule for itself by concluding that the other rule has
"proven" more successful. Still, the states' willingness to import even the
more muddled federal doctrines, like double jeopardy and three tiers of
375. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 310-11 n.4 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (describing the phrase's origin and meaning in the sovereign immunity context).
376. See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 180-85 (describing the citizens as trusting states or the federal
government with power depending on which better protects liberty).
377. See G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Foreward: Getting From Here to There: Twenty-
First Century Mechanisms and Opportunities in State Constitutional Reform, 36 RuTGERS L.J. 1075,
1075 (2005) ("Formal constitutional change is easier at the state level than at the federal level.").
378. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARv. L. REV. 633, 634-35
(2000) (rejecting persistent adherence to the current federal separation of powers and arguing for a
more internationally-inspired "constrained parliamentarianism").
379. Cf UNGER, supra note 122, at 13 (discussing the necessity to form social communities that
can re-imagine and radically reconstruct legal institutions).
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equal protection review,38 ° shows an eagerness to learn from comparative
constitutionalism and a belief in the efficacy of viewing states' own
practices in light of the questions posed in other jurisdictions.
Diversity among the states also permits mobile Americans to vote with
their feet.381 Every so often, discrete groups seek out a place of their own, a
place where their subculture will be valued and find protection in law.
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Liberals have threatened to move to Canada,383 while conservatives may
have considered South Carolina. Gay and lesbian enclaves, like San
Francisco, California or Northampton, Massachusetts offer havens of
support for people left feeling unwelcome in other communities. Racial
minorities have also sometimes sought to establish their own geographic
communities where their political power could be maximized.384 The spread
of diversity across states permits even more subtle differences to take effect;
someone may just "feel more comfortable" in a state where the culture is
only slightly more embracing of an unusual character trait than neighboring
states. By extending cultural diversity from local areas to states, cultural
minorities obtain greater access to more powerful democratic institutions.
Treating constitutions, rather than only legislation, as within the reach of
state communities makes available the full scope of debate over the values
and issues considered fundamental to the transitory set of state inhabitants.
Finally, strengthening state communities fosters tolerance by rejecting
the worst aspects of American Exceptionalism. There is certainly a place for
patriotism on the state bench, and there are many issues that state judges
may legitimately believe are best decided through national discourse as
opposed to a state's foundational law. On the other hand, American
Exceptionalism sometimes carries with it a knee-jerk jingoism, an
unquestioning belief in America as the crowning achievement of global
civilization. Such a belief system calcifies the mind and hardens the heart.
380. Cf Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1137 (1999) (criticizing state courts' adoption of
federal rationality review in contexts lacking the separation of powers, federalism, and judicial
capacity concerns that drive the federal standard).
381. See Baude, supra note 128, at 837-38 (arguing that the major interstate migrations in recent
history were the result of the migrants choice to reject their old state's moral/legal regime in favor of
other states more protective of human dignity).
382. See, e.g., Bd. of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994)
(describing a special school district created specifically for chasidic Jews).
383. See Gene Johnson, A Northern Neighbor Offers a Liberal Haven: Frustrated U.S. Voters
Look to Canada, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2004, at A14 (describing interest among politically
dissatisfied liberal Americans in emigrating to Canada).
384. Howard Witt, New Orleans Forgives Much in Mayor Race, CHI. TRIB., May 22, 2006, at 5
(describing the New Orleans mayor's advocacy for restoring African-Americans to majority status in
the city).
By occasionally reminding Americans of the state component of their
cultural identity, intermittent state constitutionalism enables us to hold two
ideas simultaneously without cognitive dissonance: state loyalty and
patriotism. 385 Emphasis on the state as a unique community permits citizens
to deal with each other as different, without sacrificing the common aspects
of national identity. True tolerance of diversity is not marked by the ability
to recognize the commonalities shared with an interlocutor; rather, it
requires the acknowledgment of difference and a willingness to move
forward in cooperation and not assimilation.386 The existence of state-
oriented communities encourages Americans to develop such a tolerance.
VII. CONCLUSION
Scholars of state constitutionalism have been pleading for greater
attention to state constitutions for over thirty years, since Hans Linde and
Justice Brennan began the New Judicial Federalism movement in the 1970s.
Formally, the lectures and articles have won the courts' grudging
endorsement, but judicial practice has only spottily matched the academic
vision of true autonomous state constitutionalism.38 7 In this Article, I have
attempted to expand this conversation. Rather than continue the cycle of
critique and praise for state courts as the object of state constitutionalism,
this Article has reconceived the courts as the subject of state
constitutionalism in an effort to finally match theory to practice.
The evidence shows that even in the strongest courts for state
constitutionalism, attention to New Judicial Federalism has remained
inconsistent. 38 8 And we have seen why this condition is likely to remain true
indefinitely.389 Still, all is not lost for devotees of state autonomy. State
constitutionalism builds and strengthens a sense of state identity for those
affected by judicial decrees. 390  Even when practiced only intermittently,
state constitutionalism can be effective at teasing out and bolstering the
strands of culture that center on the state as a community. Lawyers have a
special role as the ambassadors of state identity, a role that matches their
traditional role as translators between the popular and legal cultures.
385. See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory ofInteractive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REv. 243,
249 (2005) (arguing that the goals of federalism are best achieved when state and federal
governments are distinct but cooperative).
386. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 771 (2002) (discussing how assimilation
tends to erase individual identity and weaken community); Steven G. Gey, Unity of the Graveyard
and the Attack on Constitutional Secularism, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1005, 1021-22 (2004) (arguing
that pluralistic democracy requires government to adopt a neutral attitude toward the divergent and
competing moral and ideological commitments of its citizens).
387. See supra notes 188-291 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 193-292 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 354-64 and accompanying text
390. See supra Part VI.
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Enhancing Americans' sense of belonging to a state community is
normatively desirable. State-to-state cultural diversity advances important
goals common to profound national values. In particular, these goals include
the protection of liberty by balancing one level of authority against another,
expansion of participatory democracy, the ability to move to a more
amenable culture within the United States, and development of a stronger,
more tolerant pluralism. Intermittent state constitutionalism is here to stay,
and for that we should all be grateful.
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